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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of two essays on mutual funds. In the first essay, I show
that investors misallocate a substantial amount of capital in the active mutual fund indus-
try. To this end, I develop a novel structural identification strategy to estimate returns to
scale in active management and time-varying fund skill. A median fund is over-allocated
by $29 million, so the majority of funds are expected to underperform. The industry can
host more capital, but additional capital should go to a small fraction of funds. In par-
ticular, funds with the highest skills are severely under-allocated and account for most of
the missing capital. In the time-series, under-allocated funds can outperform their bench-
marks for three years. My findings suggest the active mutual fund industry deviates from
a frictionless rational expectations equilibrium. The disequilibrium implies the existence
of profit opportunities for informed investors and thus rationalizes the popularity of active
management.
In the second essay, we investigate the performance of active sector funds whose po-
vi
tential outperformance has not been exhausted entirely by decreasing returns to scale. We
document that, despite good track records, most sector funds are relatively smaller than
their equilibrium fund sizes — at which they are expected to generate zero net alphas.
In particular, from 1998 to 2016, a passive indexation strategy of actively managed sector
funds earns an annual benchmark-adjusted return of 5.70% and a monthly alpha of 27 basis
points. Moreover, the strategy’s outperformance is present in market downturns (i.e., re-
silient to tail risk) and robust to change of rebalancing frequency and inclusion of expenses.
Efficient diversification and under-appreciated skill – illustrated by an alpha arithmetic to
guide similar strategies – explains the strategy’s success.
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Chapter 1
How Efficiently Do Investors Allocate Capital to
Active Mutual Funds?
1.1 Introduction
Mutual funds represent a sizable share of asset allocation for many investors, as evidenced
by the trillions of capital invested in the mutual fund industry.1 Whether investors have the
ability to identify skilled managers is one of the central questions in financial economics. If
markets are competitive and investors rational, the supply of capital reflects investors’ eval-
uation of the managerial skill, and fund size reveals the differential ability across managers
(Berk and Green, 2004). Does fund size in the data match the manager’s ability? I approach
this question by measuring capital misallocation in the active mutual fund industry.
I define Capital misallocation as the gap between the fund size observed in the data and
the fund size at which investors expect to receive zero net alpha. The size of a fund is related
to its expected performance due to decreasing returns to scale: As the fund size increases,
the manager’s ability to outperform passive benchmarks declines. In addition, fund size
continuously changes as investors reallocate capital in response to fund performance. They
supply capital to funds that have positive expected net alphas and, conversely, remove
capital from funds that have negative expected net alphas. As a result, fund size should
adjust to ensure that the net alpha to investors is zero. A non-zero expected net alpha at
the observed fund size indicates either an insufficient or excessive supply of capital and, in
1As of 2017, the US mutual fund industry invests $18.7 trillion on behalf of 56.2 million households and
controls 25% of US Corporate Equity. See (Investment Company Institute, 2018).
1
2summary, capital misallocation.
In this paper, I demonstrate that investors misallocate a substantial amount of capital
in the active fund industry. Most of the funds are oversized and are expected to under-
perform their passive benchmarks, although there is strong evidence of fund skill once I
control for the effects of scale. In aggregate, however, the active mutual fund industry
can still grow in size. 40% of funds can manage more capital, and those most skilled are
severely undersized. As a result of capital under-allocation, these undersized funds gener-
ate positive net alphas for about three years, rewarding informed investors for identifying
them. More broadly, these alpha-producing opportunities provide investors the incentives
for participating in the active mutual fund market.
To gauge the zero-alpha fund size, which I term efficient fund size, I develop a stylized
rational expectations model in the same vein of (Berk and Green, 2004). The equilibrium
works as follows: At the end of each period, capital flows into and out of each fund so that
the expected net alpha for any surviving fund is zero. Fund skill is time-varying, but its law
of motion is not specified. My approach requires weak assumptions and nests a wide class
of models.
The key parameters for my approach are fund skills and the rate at which fund per-
formance erodes due to bigger fund size. To this end, I develop a structural identification
strategy to estimate the relation between fund performance, fund skill, and fund size. My
estimator allows me to establish the fund-level decreasing return to scale2 while estimating
time-varying fund skill. I accomplish this significant extension by generalizing the struc-
tural identification strategy of (Olley and Pakes, 1996) to the financial economics context.
My identification exploits a simple idea: A fund trades more when it perceives greater profit
2There is mixed evidence on fund-level returns to scale in the literature. For example, (Chen et al., 2004)
and (Yan, 2008) find negative relationship between fund size and performance. (Reuter and Zitzewitz, 2010)
found non-significant relationship. Recent developments focus on correcting the many econometrics biases
in the estimation returns to scale in active management. See (Pástor et al., 2015) and (Zhu, 2018). The former
does not establish fund-level decreasing returns to scale while the latter does.
3opportunities (Pástor et al., 2017a); therefore, fund turnover3 helps to infer time variation
in fund skill.
My data comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Suvivior-Bias-
Free US Mutual Fund Database. I follow the data preparation procedures in (Berk and
van Binsbergen, 2015) to clean data. The finalized data set contains 4,186 domestic active
equity funds from 1977 through 2017.
My first finding is that the active mutual fund industry has become more skilled in the
past four decades. Since 1977, the value-weighted average fund skill grows at a rate of
more than 3% per annum. To understand this growth, I decompose the value-weighted
average fund skill into two parts: the skill of an average fund and the covariance between
fund skill and fund share of industry capital. Since fund sizes reveal fund skills in a ratio-
nal market, this covariance is a measure of investors’ ability to identify skilled managers.
Over the past four decades, the skill of an average active mutual fund deteriorated. On the
other hand, the covariance between skill and capital share grows; more capital has gone to
more skilled managers. This increase in the association between skill and size is behind
the growth of the value-weighted average fund skill.
However, my results also suggest that investors misallocate a substantial amount of cap-
ital. The distribution of observed fund size is closely concentrated around $1,507 million,
while the distribution of efficient fund size is dispersed. If investors have perfect knowledge
of fund skills, many funds would be larger, and many other funds would have to exit.
A median fund is $29 million larger than its efficient size, and 60% of funds in my sam-
ple are over-allocated. The cross-sectional average capital misallocation is -$1,975 million.
This number suggests that the active equity fund industry can host more capital. Further-
more, the conclusion depends on a small fraction of funds. Excluding the bottom 10% of
capital misallocation moves the average capital misallocation to merely -$39 million. This
change shows that the additional capital should go to funds in the tail of the distribution.
3That is, the percentage of fund portfolio’s holdings that have been replaced during a period.
4Searching these funds can be hard, and search costs lower the net gain. Indeed, a search
cost of 30 basis points leaves investors a chance of only 9% to beat the passive benchmark.
I then sort funds into groups according to their average skills and calculate the mean
fund size in each group. The mean observed fund size monotonically increase with skill,
reflecting that investors manage to identify skilled managers, but the mean efficient fund
size is significantly from the mean observed fund size, especially in the high-skill groups.
More specifically, the funds in the high-skill groups are under-allocated, while the funds in
the low-skill groups are over-allocated. In other words, investors fail to reward high-skill
funds with adequate capital or penalize low-skill funds with sufficient share redemptions.
Does the capital misallocation mitigate in the long run? I proceed to study its per-
sistence. Each month I divide funds into under-allocated funds and over-allocated funds,
then I track their net alphas in the following ten years. Consistent with the implications
of capital misallocation, in the beginning, the under-allocated funds outperform while the
over-allocated funds underperform. But investors respond to these two groups asymmet-
rically. The net alphas of the under-allocated funds decline over time as investors allocate
more capital to them and eventually become indifferent from zero after three years; the net
alphas of over-allocated funds, on the other hand, remain negative and never recover.
This asymmetric performance persistence helps to reconcile the unwavering popularity
of active management with its poor track record. In the long run, under-allocated funds be-
come fully-funded and deliver zero net alpha, while over-allocated funds continue to retain
too much capital and generate negative net alpha. As a result, an average fund underper-
forms in the long run. In the short run, however, a subset of investors could earn positive
net alpha for as long as three years. This persistent outperformance represents a reward
that rationalizes investors’ enthusiasm.
My measure of fund skill is the gross alpha a fund can generate on the first dollar in-
vested in the fund. This measure separates the effects of scale as it measures a fund’s ability
5to identify mispricing opportunities before it is eroded by decreasing returns to scale. As
shown by (Berk and van Binsbergen, 2015), controlling the effects of scale can produce
markedly different conclusions to the skill of managers. Many earlier papers use alpha to
measure skill and implicitly assume a constant returns to scale.4
The current paper contributes to the literature of mutual funds in several important
ways. First, this paper proposes a new estimator for the returns to scale in active manage-
ment. The literature presents mixed-evidence of diminishing returns to scale at the fund
level,5 and the estimation needs to correct several econometric biases. (Pástor et al., 2015)
propose the first unbiased estimator, which is subsequently enhanced by (Zhu, 2018) to
have stronger statistical power. These estimators, however, can only estimate time-invariant
fund skills. My estimator extends this literature by introducing a structural identification
strategy that infers the time-series variation in fund skills. The strategy borrows wisdom
from the empirical Industrial Organization literature, which, for the estimation of produc-
tion functions, contains the seminal work of (Olley and Pakes, 1996) and its subsequent
refinements (See (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003), (Wooldridge, 2009), and (Ackerberg et al.,
2015)). As shown by this paper, allowing fund skills to be time-varying produces notably
different and more plausible estimates for the returns to scale in active management.
Second, this paper expands the literature that seeks to reconcile the popularity of active
funds with their poor track records.6 (Gruber, 1996), who first highlighted this puzzle, ra-
tionalizes investors’ demand by showing that new fund flow (both into and out of funds)
predict fund performance and earn higher returns than the average active fund. This pa-
4See (Jensen, 1968), (Malkiel, 1995), (Carhart, 1997), (Wermers, 2000), and (Fama and French, 2010),
among others.
5Apart from the papers cited below, see also (Chen et al., 2004), (Yan, 2008), (Reuter and Zitzewitz,
2010), and (Harvey and Liu, 2017), among others.
6Apart from (Gruber, 1996) and (Pástor and Stambaugh, 2012), which are closely related to the current pa-
per, other papers have also addressed this puzzle. (Glode, 2011) suggests that investors are rational to accept
unconditional underperformance if active funds outperform in recessions. (Guercio and Reuter, 2014) argues
that there is no evidence of underperformance among direct-sold funds; the underperformance concentrate in
the group of funds sold through brokers.
6per corroborates Gruber’s “smart money" explanation by showing that the under-allocated
funds outperform their benchmarks for three years. Different from (Gruber, 1996), who
treats all funds homogeneously, I demonstrate that only new cash flows to under-allocated
funds are profitable; the cash flows into over-allocated funds keep earning negative alphas.
Another explanation, popularized by (Pástor and Stambaugh, 2012), argues that in-
vestors only slowly learn the true returns to scale in active management and therefore al-
locate too much capital to the active management industry. Their study is similar to mine
in that it also connects underperformance with over-allocation, but there are two important
differences. First, their study assumes diseconomies of scale at the industry level. Second,
from its industry-level decreasing returns to scale, their study suggests that an oversized ac-
tive fund industry is what leads to the underperformance of an average fund. In the current
paper, however, I find that the industry can manage more capital and the loss of allocative-
efficiency in the cross-section — 60% of funds being oversized — explains the average
negative net alpha.
Third, this paper fits into a growing literature of capital misallocation in the mutual
fund industry. (Roussanov et al., 2017) extends (Berk and Green, 2004)’s model to include
costly investor search. They find similar capital misallocation pattern in the skill groups
and attribute it to the information distortion due to mutual fund marketing. (Song, 2017)
demonstrates that a group of funds accumulate too much capital to the point that they sig-
nificantly underperform. This happens because investors mistake fund exposures to factors
other than the market factor for the skill of manager. Similar to the current paper, his study
suggests the average underperformance is caused by a subset of oversized funds. My study
differs from theirs in two ways. First, neither of these studies links the capital misalloca-
tion to the popularity of active management; the current paper goes further by showing the
existence of positive alphas among under-allocated funds (in both cross-section and time-
series) and using them to rationalize investor’s demand for active funds. Second, these
7studies emphasize the cause of capital misallocation, whereas the current paper focuses on
empirical regularities. To my knowledge, the current paper is the first study that directly
and thoroughly examines capital misallocation in the active fund industry. As a result, the
stylized facts from this paper can inform theoretical studies. In particular, this paper em-
phasizes the necessity of capital misallocation: If there is no capital misallocation — hence
no positive net alpha — no investors would have incentives to search skilled funds.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the model and shows
how capital misallocation is measured. Section 1.3 lays out the estimation procedures. Sec-
tion 1.4 describes the dataset. Section 1.5 presents my empirical results. I first estimate the
returns to scale in active management, followed by an analysis of the evolution of skills
in the industry. I then study the cross-section of capital misallocation and the time-series
implications of capital misallocation. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Model
I describe active fund production function, investor rationality, and equilibrium fund size in
this section. I then define the efficient fund size and describe how it helps gauging capital
misallocation. My model encompasses a wide class of models in which the dynamics of
fund skill are different.
1.2.1 Active Mutual Fund in Equilibrium
For an active fund at time t, I assume its gross alpha agit is characterized by a production
function as follows:
agit = ait bqit 1, (1.1)
where qit 1 is invested capital carried over from last period, ait is the gross alpha earned
on the first dollar invested, and  b is the returns to scale for active management. Assum-
7See also (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) and (Gârleanu and Pedersen, 2018).
8ing b > 0, this production assumes a decreasing returns to scale for active management.
For every extra dollar invested, the gross alpha decreases at rate of b. Because mispricing
opportunities have a finite supply, active managers find it harder to outperform the market
with more capital.
Similar to (Pástor et al., 2015), I seek to measure the fund’s ability to identify prof-
itable investment opportunities before they are eroded by decreasing returns to scale. My
measure of a fund skill is ait in Equation (1.1).8
Since the investment opportunity set is time-varying, it is natural to assume ait —which
captures active manger’s ability of identifying mispricing opportunities — is also time-
varying. I differ from (Berk and Green, 2004) in this important aspect as Berk and Green
assume a constant fund skill ait = ai. Recent literature presents evidence that manager’s
ability to outperformmarket does change over time. For example, (Kacperczyk et al., 2014)
show that manager’s skill is different in booms and recessions.9
I make weak assumptions on the dynamics of fund skill ait . First, let ait+1 be deter-
mined by the end of time t. That is, ait+1 2 Ft , where Ft is the entire information set by the
end of time t. Second, instead of giving an explicit law of motion, I assume that ait follows
an exogenous first-order Markov process. Formally, this means the following holds true
p(ait+1|Ft 1) = p(ait+1|ait).
Specifically, one in period t, having just observed ait , infers that the distribution of ait+1 is
given by p(ait+1|ait). One concrete example for a first-order Markov process would be an
AR(1) process: ait+1 = rait + vit .10 Notice that my assumption encompasses the constant
8In contrast, traditional measures of fund skill such as net alpha do not separate the effects of scale. See
(Berk and van Binsbergen, 2015) Section 4 for a detailed discussion.
9For performance variation in business cycles, see also (Moskowitz, 2000), (Kosowski, 2011), (Glode,
2011), and (Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt, 2015). For related literature in which conditioning variables are
used to model time-varying fund performance, see (Ferson and Schadt, 1996) and (Avramov and Wermers,
2006). Among others, see also (Koch et al., 2016), (Brown et al., 1996), and (Huang et al., 2011).
10For example, (Roussanov et al., 2017) use an AR(1) time-varying skill to extend the Berk and Green
model.
9skill model of Berk and Green.
The realized gross alpha rgit , i.e., the actual excess return over passive benchmark re-
ceived by investors is given by
rgit = a
g
it + eit ,
where the return surprise, eit , has zero mean and is independently distributed through time.
I do not specify the distribution of eit , either. The weak requirement of return surprise, eit ,
along with the weak assumption of fund skill, ait , allows me to nest a wide range of mod-
els in which parameter dynamics can differ. In particular, different assumptions regarding
fund skill, ait , and return surprise, eit , can lead to different Bayesian learning process for
the agents, and accordingly different equilibrium fund size. As will be evident shortly in
the measurement of capital misallocation (See Section 1.2.2), my approach does not require
the explicit modeling of investor learning. Hence, I only need weak assumptions, and they
increase the robustness of my results.
Due to this return surprise term, eit , investors do not have perfect knowledge of the
gross alpha agit . As a result, they have to learn the parameter values. Investors update their
beliefs (posteriors) on ait+1 as Bayesians. The returns to scale of active management,  b,
is common knowledge. Let At be the information set of investors. Define the posterior
mean of fund skill by the end of time t as
µit = E[ait+1|At ] = Et [ait+1],
where, without specific reference to information set, Et [·] always refers to the time t expec-
tation with respect to investor information set At .
The timing convention is as follows. The fund enters period t with qit 1 funds under
management and an estimate of managerial ability, µit 1. Managers and investors observe
rgit —from which they can infer a
g
it — and update their estimate of the manager’s ability by
calculating µit . Managers make changes in fund fees if any. Then capital flows into or out
10
of the fund to determine qit .
I assume the investors are rational and have infinite elasticity of demand for a positive
expected net alpha, i.e., excess return over passive benchmark net of fees. Conversely,
investors should extract capital from all funds that have negative expected net alphas. An
investor participation constraint can characterize investor behavior. For any surviving fund,
let rnit+1 denotes realized net alpha, the following holds true at the end of each period:
Et [rnit+1] = Et [r
g
it+1  pit ]  0,
where pit is fund fee in percentage. At the end of each period, investors reallocate capital.
During this process, fund size adjusts, a larger fund size leads to a lower expected gross
alpha (due to decreasing returns to scale), and expected net alpha for each surviving fund
becomes zero:
Et [rnit+1] = 0. (1.2)
The competition among investors drives the marginal return on the last dollar invested to
zero. All investors in the active fund end up earning zero expected net alpha. They become
indifferent between investing in an active fund or its passive benchmark. Condition (1.2)
implies that all active funds in equilibrium should earn zero net alpha, regardless of their
difference in skills. For this reason, net alpha, despite being widely used in empirical stud-
ies,11 is not a valid measure of manager’s skill. Lastly, note that investors adjust fund size
to ensure that this condition holds.
The rest of this section assumes the manager invests all capital actively. If one is willing
to assume that investors and managers are symmetrically informed, then a manager who
maximizes her expected compensation would only put part of the capital in active manage-
ment. Otherwise, she needs to adjust the fund fee constantly. Appendix A.1 presents the
extended model in which the manager’s problem is included. The full model does not affect
11See, for example, (Jensen, 1968), (Carhart, 1997), and (Fama and French, 2010).
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the discussion below except that it requires a modified interpretation of the parameter b.12
Substituting the fund production function (1.1) into the equilibrium condition constraint
(1.2) gives the equilibrium fund size
qit =
µit  pit
b
. (1.3)
Lastly, let us consider the entry and exit of the active mutual funds. Notice that the expected
net alpha Et [anit+1] = µit  bqit   pit . In expectation, µit   pit is the highest gross alpha the
fund could deliver. I assume any existing fund with expected net skill µit   pit < 0 will
close, and any fund attempting to enter the market must have µit  pit > 0.13 For investors,
any fund with negative expected net skill could never outperform its passive benchmark, so
it is irrational to invest.
1.2.2 Measuring Capital Misallocation
For any surviving fund, its size reflects investors’ belief for its skill. The belief µit is not
directly observable but it must be unbiased if investors are Bayesians. Regardless of the
specific learning process, the following must hold true: E[µit ] = E[E(ait |At)] = E[ait+1].
Let efficient fund size be defined as
qeit =
ait+1  pit
b
, (1.4)
12Without information asymmetry, investors know how much capital is actively managed. However, it
is very hard to measure that amount empirically. This gap is what leads me to deemphasize the manager’s
problem.
13For a fund with µit  pit < 0, any positive fund size qit will lead to a violation of the investor participation
constraint. Therefore, this inequality requirement is necessary.
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it is straightforward to show the following moment condition is true:14
E[qit ] = E[qeit ]. (1.5)
A couple of comments are in order. First, the observed fund size may differ from the
efficient fund size due to a temporal bias µit   ait+1 that has a zero unconditional mean.
Condition (1.5) posits that, although there could be temporal differences in the observed
fund size and the efficient fund size, investors on average allocate the proper amount of cap-
ital to an active fund. Second, condition (1.5) is testable. Fund size qit is observed, while
efficient fund size qeit can be estimated. Additionally, both unconditional expectations have
sample analogues, they can be consistently estimated with time-series sample mean. Fi-
nally, efficient fund size is nothing but the equilibrium fund size chosen by investors when
they have perfect knowledge of fund skill ait+1. For this reason, I set the efficient fund size
to zero if ait+1  pit < 0. This is because, with perfect knowledge, investors would allocate
zero capital to a fund with negative net alpha. Moreover, this normalization avoids any
negative efficient fund size, which has ambiguous economic interpretation.15
Because condition (1.5) should hold for every fund in an efficient active mutual fund
market, any violation suggests capital misallocation. In particular, define the capital mis-
allocation bMi in the following way
bMi = qi  bqei , (1.6)
14For any surviving fund, µit   pit > 0, pit is observable, and b is not in the conditional information set, so
that
E[qit ] = E

µit   pit
b
 
= E

E
✓
ait+1  pit
b
   At◆ = Eait+1  pitb
 
= E[qeit ].
15Mathematically, let dti be the probability of ait+1  pit < 0, this normalization is a modification to the
random variable net skill ait+1  pit , which now has a Dirac measure of dti at 0. In economic terms, dti is the
probability of liquidation.
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where
qi =
ÂTit=1 qit
Ti
and bqei = ÂTit=1 bqeitTi , (1.7)
and qi and qei are time-series averages of observed fund size and efficient fund sizes, re-
spectively. Here bqeit is the estimate of efficient fund size qeit , and Ti is the number of periods
fund i exists. Notice that moment condition (1.5) nests a wide class of models in which the
investor beliefs are different.
The average capital misallocation across funds can be estimated in two ways. The first
is the ex ante mean that is the simple average of all individual fund’s capital misallocation:
M =
1
N
N
Â
i=1
bMi, (1.8)
and the ex post mean, which is the weighted average capital misallocation
MW =
ÂNi=1Ti bMi
ÂNi=1Ti
, (1.9)
where weights are the number of periods a fund exists in the database.
1.3 Estimation
The current paper estimates the following model, where b is the key economic parameter
of interest.
rit = ait +bqit 1+ eit ,
ait = hi+wit .
(1.10)
Model (1.10) adapts from Equation (1.1), i.e., the production function of alpha-generation
in the theory (See Section 1.2). The return surprise eit is orthogonal to all right-hand vari-
ables and have zero mean. The term ait measures the amount of alpha the fund can generate
on the first dollar invested, it is the skill of the fund. The parameter b (expected to be neg-
ative) is the returns to scale parameter and measures the rate at which fund performance
deteriorates as the fund gets bigger.
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I decompose the time-varying fund skill ait into two parts: a time-invariant part, hi, and
a cyclical part, wit . The fund-specific constant hi is regarded as the skill a fund possesses
when it has zero capital under management and does not trade. This constant part intro-
duces permanent differences in skills that are necessary to account for the cross-sectional
variation in fund performance. The cyclical part, wit , generates the time-variation in the
fund skill. Intuitively, wit acts as a shock to fund skill: as the market moves, hot sectors
and cold sectors rotate while funds with different investment strategies see changes in their
investment opportunity sets. It is worth noting that, when wit = 0, the fund has constant
skill and Model (1.10) collapses to a fixed-effect model studied by recent literature (See
(Pástor et al., 2015), (Zhu, 2018), and Appendix A.2).
1.3.1 Identification Assumptions
My identification strategy is inspired by (Olley and Pakes, 1996), who study the dynamics
of productivity in the telecommunications equipment industry. Using an approach similar
to theirs, I analyze the production function of active mutual funds.
(Olley and Pakes, 1996) use a function of observable investment rate to infer the unob-
servable time-varying productivity shock, so their strategy is often termed “proxy function"
approach. To infer the unobservable time-varying fund skill, I also need a proxy. My choice
of proxy is the fund turnover ratio because an active fund’s turnover should have a positive
relation with its subsequent skill.
Active funds identify alpha-generating opportunities and trade securities to exploit
them. Each period, they establish positions that yield alphas in the subsequent period.
For example, active funds buy underpriced assets in period t and profit from the correction
of mispricing in period t+1.
Trading generates revenue but also incurs transaction costs, so active funds choose the
optimal turnover to maximize their expected gross alphas. As a result, a fund trades more
when it perceives more alpha-producing opportunities, and a fund should have a higher
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performance after it trades more (Pástor et al., 2017a).
In my setup, fund skill measures the expected fund performance, net of the effects of
scale (Equation (1.10)). Therefore a higher turnover should imply a higher skill. In par-
ticular, the cyclical part of fund skill wit varies over time in the presence of time-varying
investment opportunities, so I inferwit with fund turnover.16 In light of this positive relation
between turnover and subsequent fund skill,17 I give the formal identification assumptions
are as follows.
Assumption 1. Conditional on fund size qit and fund turnover nit , the next-period cyclical
fund skill wit+1 is determined by
wit+1 = h(qit ,nit). (1.11)
Assumption 2. The cyclical part of fund skill wit+1 follows a first-order Markov process.
So it evolves over time according to the distribution
p(wit+1|Iit 1) = p(wit+1|wit), (1.12)
where It 1 is the fund’s entire information set by the end of time t 1.18
Assumption 1 formalizes my argument of the relation between fund turnover and fund
skill. The unknown function h(·) avoids the explicit solution to a fund’s optimal turnover.
The fund size qit is necessary in this framework for two reasons. First, fund size captures
the effects of scale. Second, fund size accounts for the cross-sectional variation in funds’
targeted universes. For example, a large-cap fund usually trades large-cap stocks. The tar-
geted universe can introduce heterogeneity in the relation between skill and turnover. In
essence, Assumption 1 makes the fund level skill shock wit+1 observable with respect to
16Technically, the previous discussion implies that total fund skill ait can be inferred with fund turnover.
But the decomposition in Equation (1.10) implies that only the cyclical part of fund skill wit is time-varying.
17(Pástor et al., 2017a) provide a formal model for this relation. They also presents empirical evidence for
this relation.
18Note the fund information set It does not have to coincide with investors’ information set At . Realistic
assumption is that At ✓ It , because managers have more information about their portfolio and its profitability.
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the econometrician’s information set.19
It is straightforward to extend Assumption 1 and include other variables to increase
explanatory power. Similar transaction-profit relationships are widely studied in the liter-
ature, for example, when analyzing fund quarter-end holdings.20 In this paper, I choose to
keep the model parsimonious and use turnover alone to infer the time-varying skill.21
Assumption 2 is about how funds form their perception of the evolution of cyclical
skill over time. The payoff for transactions does not occur in a single period but usually
lasts for several periods; there is, therefore, some persistence in fund’s cyclical skill. Note
that Equation (1.11) indicates that wit+1 is measurable by the end of time t, hence, the
lagged information conditioning corresponds to information set in time t 1. Funds oper-
ate through time, obtain knowledge of wt at time t 1 and form expectations of wit+1 using
p(wit+1|wit).
This assumption is general enough to nest many dynamics. In the case of an AR(1)
process, we have wit+1 = rwit + eit+1, and it is worth pointing out that in such case my
Model (1.10) is equivalent to the dynamic panel model of (Blundell and Bond, 2000). My
estimation using dynamic panel methodology leads to a rejection of this AR(1) dynamics.
Moreover, the dynamic panel methodology uses GMM with unjustifiable moment condi-
tions in my context.22
19Another good way to motivate this assumption is to think through revealed preferences. Since funds
optimize according to their beliefs about subsequent-period profitability, their behavior, i.e., how much they
trade, then reflects their beliefs.
20One could think of other proxy variables to replace turnover ratio; one candidate is the active share pro-
posed by (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009), which measures how much a fund’s holdings deviate from bench-
mark index holdings. One can also add more exogenous conditioning variables in function (1.11) if they
believe such variables will be helpful in predicting fund performance. Since function (1.11) is assumed to
be common for all funds, possible other variables can be macroeconomic-related. Finally, it is also straight-
forward to add more exogenous variables in model (1.10). For papers relating fund holdings to fund perfor-
mance, see, for example, (Jiang et al., 2007), (Elton et al., 2011), (Kacperczyk and Seru, 2007), (Kacperczyk
et al., 2005), (Kacperczyk et al., 2006) among many others.
21To my knowledge, fund turnover is also the only documented variable that predicts a time-series instead
of a cross-sectional relationship. In my setting, I need a time-series relationship.
22In our setting, (Blundell and Bond, 2000) use moment condition
E[Dqit s(hi+wit)] = 0,
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1.3.2 Estimating Fund Skill and Returns to Scale of Active Management
This section discusses the estimation procedures for Model (1.10). Technical details can
be found in Appendix A.2.2. We begin by substituting Equation (1.11) (See assumption 2)
into Model (1.10) to get
rit = hi+ f (qit 1,nit 1)+ eit , (1.13)
where
f (qit 1,nit 1) = bqit 1+h(qit 1,nit 1). (1.14)
This model can be estimated with semi-parametric methods that treat the function f (·) non-
parametrically. And the constant term hi can be treated as a fixed-effect. Since f (·) controls
for the unobservable cyclical skill wit and hi controls for the permanent fund heterogene-
ity, regression (1.13) dose not suffer from an omitted-variable bias (See Appendix A.2.1).
Following (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003), I use a third-order polynomial series expansion
in qit 1 and nit 1 for f (·). There is no constant in this polynomial because it is nested
into hi.23 Using the polynomial expansion for f (·), the estimation of first stage Equation
(1.13) boils down to running a fixed-effects estimation on a polynomial regression.24 Note
the advantages of treating the function f (·) nonparametrically. It avoids the necessity of
specifying function h(·) which can be a complicated solution to an optimization problem.
Since lagged fund size qit 1 is included in this fixed-effects regression, we run into
the finite-sample bias discussed by (Pástor et al., 2015). To correct this bias, I utilize
(Zhu, 2018)’s enhanced recursive-demeaning technique for the first-stage regression (See
Appendix A.2.1).
The previous procedure ensures that we have a consistent estimator of the function
which means the change in fund size is orthogonal to fund skill —an apparent contradiction of my model.
23When both lagged fund size qit 1 and lagged turnover nit 1 are zero, the fund is not operating so that it
has zero cyclical skill (See Equation (1.14)). Thus, the time-invariant skill hi is exactly identified in the first
stage.
24To avoid multicollinearity in polynomial terms, I regress on the orthogonal basis of polynomials. The
same technique is used in all the polynomial regression in the following.
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f (·). Let bf (qit 1,nit 1) be the estimated sum of the polynomial terms for a particular
(qit 1,nit 1) pair, we also have fixed effects estimates as
bhi = 1Ti
Ti
Â
t=1
(rit  bf (qit 1,nit 1)) 8i. (1.15)
Up to this point, bqit 1 is collinear with the linear term in polynomial f (·). Next, we
proceed to the second stage estimation to separate bqit 1 from f (qit 1,nit 1) and identify
parameter b. Substituting Equation (1.11) into the definition of function f (·) gives
wit = f (qit 1,nit 1) bqit 1 = wit(b). (1.16)
Also, notice that Assumption 2 implies that we can write wit as a function of wit 1:
wit+1 = E[wit+1|It 1]+xit+1
= E[wit+1|wit ]+xit+1
= g(wit)+xit+1,
(1.17)
where xit+1 represents an innovation that is orthogonal to information set It 1. Given a
hypothetical guess of b, I then construct
bwit(b) = bf (qit 1,nit 1) bqit 1.
Using Equation (1.17), I regress bwit+1(b) on bwit(b), where, similarly, I approximate func-
tion g(wit) with a third-order polynomial in wit . The residuals of this regression are the im-
plied values of bxit+1(b). To get the point estimate of b, I search in space of candidate b that
minimizes the sum of squared bxit+1(b). That is, I search for b that minimizes the objective
J(b) =min
b
min
g Ât,i
⇣bxit+1(b)⌘2. (1.18)
This is equivalent to a non-linear least square regression. To get an estimate of standard
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errors of bˆ, I use clustered-bootstrap in which I treat each fund as a cluster.
Once bb is determined, I also determine the cyclical skill bwit+1(b). Accordingly, the
total fund skill ait+1 is given by
bait+1 = bhi+ bwi+1. (1.19)
Finally, with estimates of total skill and returns to scale bb, the estimate of efficient fund
size (when net skill ait+1  pit   0) is also determined:
bqit = bait+1  pitbb {bait+1 > pit}, (1.20)
where pit is fund fee in the data, and bb= bb. Notice the indicator function liquidates any
fund with negative net skill.
1.4 Data
I use data from CRSP survivorship-bias-free mutual database, ranging from 1977 through
2017. The sample contains 4,186 mutual funds from the United States. Appendix A.3
supplements the information below.
I only include actively-managed domestic equity funds. Therefore, I exclude index
funds, bond funds, money market funds, international funds, fund of funds, industry funds,
real estate funds, target retirement funds, balanced funds, and alternative funds.
For data before 1992 for which fund total net assets (TNA) are not reported monthly,
I fill missing TNAs with the most recent observations.25 There are many missing expense
ratios in the CRSP database, and I fill missing expense ratios by extending any reported
observation during a year to the entire fiscal year of the fund. This allows me to have non-
missing expense ratios for 83.5% of the observations. I drop the remaining observations
25In Appendix A.4, I compare estimation results from the full sample with those from the post-1991 sample
and demonstrate that the results are similar.
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because expense ratio is a key variable for fund performance.
Many funds provide different share classes; these share classes usually only differ in fee
structure. I group different share classes into a single fund by taking the AUM-weighted
average of non-missing values.
I adjust all fund AUM numbers by inflation and express them in January 1, 2017 Dol-
lars. A fund has to reach $15 million before it is included in my sample. The 15-million
threshold guards against the omission bias of (Elton et al., 2001). Once the fund is included,
however, it remains in the sample even if its AUM subsequently drops below $15 mil-
lion. Keeping the funds with subsequent poor performance alleviates the incubation bias
in (Evans, 2010). After this adjustment, I also drop funds with less than 24 months of data.
The fund turnover ratios are reported annually. For monthly data, I use the lagged
turnover ratio from the most recent fiscal year-end. My methodology uses the time-series
variation in fund turnover (See Section 1.3), so, for cleaner identification, I eliminate the
cross-sectional difference.26 For each fund, I standardize its time-series of the turnover
ratio by deducting the time-series mean and dividing by standard deviation. The standard-
ization puts fund turnover ratios in the same scale.
To calculate fund alphas, I follow (Berk and van Binsbergen, 2015) and use a group of
eight Vanguard index funds27 as the benchmark (See Table 1.1).
[Insert Table 1.2]
The summary statistics are reported in Table 1.2. The average gross return is 90 basis
points per month, while the average net return is 79 basis points. The average monthly
expense ratio is 10 basis points or 1.2% annually. The Gross alpha (BvB) are the alphas es-
timated with respect to the Vanguard benchmark. The average gross alpha is 7 basis points
26Fund investment mandates affect their average turnover ratios. For example, funds that use momentum-
type strategies usually have higher average turnover ratios.
27I exclude three international equity funds from the original list in (Berk and van Binsbergen, 2015)
because I focus on the domestic fund.
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per month. After fee, the average net alpha is -4 basis points. The negativity reflects the
underperformance of an average active fund.28 Both gross alpha and net alpha have large
variations, with a standard deviation of 1.97% for net alpha; the 1st percentile for net alpha
is -5.26 percent, while the 99th percentile is 5.39%. I also calculate the alphas with Fama-
French-Carhart (FFC) factors; the results are reported in rows of Gross alpha (FFC) and
Net alpha (FFC). The distributions of alphas from the two sets of benchmarks are similar.
Notably, the net alpha from Vanguard benchmark (-4 basis points) is higher than that from
FFC factors (-8 basis points). The alpha estimate with FFC factors are somewhat more
stringent because investors cannot trade FFC factors.29An average fund has $1.5 billion of
assets under management. This number is somewhat misleading since the size distribution
is dramatically skewed: the median fund manages $261 million in comparison. The av-
erage raw turnover ratio is 80.42% per year in the sample. For the standardized turnover
ratio, on the other hand, it is not surprising to see that it has a mean of 0 and a standard
deviation of 1. Finally, the average fund age is about 15 years.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Decreasing Returns to Scale
Table 1.3 reports the estimation results for returns to scale in active management. Panel A
reports the point estimate of the parameter b in the regression model rit = ait+bqit 1+eit ,
while panel B reports percentiles for skill ait . The slope coefficient b is multiplied by 106
for interpretation. The reported numbers indicate how many basis points in performance
the fund loses if its size increases by $100 million. I consider five approaches: plain or-
dinary least square (OLS), OLS with fixed-effects (FE), recursive-demeaning (RD1) from
(Pástor et al., 2015), recursive-demeaning (RD2) from (Zhu, 2018), and (Polynomial) Se-
28See (Malkiel, 1995), (Gruber, 1996), (Wermers, 2000), and (Fama and French, 2010).
29See Appendix A.3 for more discussions on the choice of benchmark and their implications.
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ries estimator from Section 1.3.30
The first four approaches all appeared in the literature before;31 I summarize their prop-
erties here (See Appendix A.2 for more details). The OLS approach and FE approach pro-
duce positively biased and negatively biased coefficient estimates, respectively. Both the
RD1 and RD2 approaches give unbiased estimates but require the assumption that fund
skill is time-invariant. Moreover, the RD1 estimator lacks statistical power to reject the
null hypothesis of constant returns to scale.
[Insert Table 1.3]
The first four columns of Table 1.3 report the results for the OLS, FE, and two RD specifi-
cations. Column 1 shows the result of the OLS approach. As explained, the estimated coef-
ficient is likely to be biased upwards. The point estimate is positive (0.008) but statistically
insignificant (t-statistic = 0.97). Column 2 shows the result using the FE approach. The FE
approach produces a negative coefficient estimate (-0.088). However, this estimate is likely
to be negatively biased, as explained, and the estimate is not statistically significant. The
RD1 approach in column 3 avoids the negative bias from FE approach. As expected, col-
umn 3 gives a less negative coefficient estimate (-0.017), but it does not have enough power
to establish the statistical significance of decreasing returns to scale (t-statistic = -0.33). In
column 4, the enhanced recursive-demeaning estimator RD2 not only produces a negative
coefficient estimate (-0.675) but also rejects constant returns to scale (t-statistic = -3.09).
RD2 approach is supposed to correct the negative bias in the FE approach and produces
a less negative coefficient estimate; it fails in that regard. Overall, these estimators give
mixed evidence on the magnitude of decreasing returns to scale in active management.
30To be more specific, with different estimators, I estimate slightly different regressions. With OLS, I
estimate model rit = a+ bqit 1 + vit , where constant a does not have the economic meaning of fund skill.
Consequently, there is no corresponding numbers in panel B for OLS estimator. For fixed-effects estimator
(FE) and recursive-demeaning estimators (RD1 and RD2), I estimate the model rit = ai+bqit 1+ eit , where
ai corresponds to the fund skill in Berk and Green model and is constraint to be time-invariant. Finally, Series
estimator from this paper estimate the full model rit = a+bqit 1+ eit , which nests the previous models.
31Apart from the papers that are already cited, see also: (Chen et al., 2004), (Yan, 2008), and (Ferreira
et al., 2013).
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Finally, column 5 of Table 1.3 shows the result for the Series approach proposed in
this paper. It gives a statistically significant point estimate -0.333 (t-statistic =  5.21).
Consider a $100 million increase in fund size, which is substantial as it represents about a
38% increase in the size of the median fund in my sample (Table 1.2). The point estimate
implies that an additional $100 million decreases the fund performance by 0.333 basis
points per month or 4.00 basis points per year. In contrast, the point estimate in the FE
approach (-0.088) implies merely 1.06 basis points of loss in performance.
It is helpful to consider why the Series approach from Section 1.3 gives a more plausi-
ble coefficient estimate than the FE approach. Active funds have time-varying investment
opportunity sets that sometimes presents fewer profitable investments. During these peri-
ods, active funds are less “active" and index (passively manage) part of their capital. In this
case, using total net assets (TNA) to estimate b in active management biases the estimated
coefficient towards zero because the part of passively managed capital has b= 0. This bias
exists in all existing methods because one can only observe TNA instead of the size of
actively managed capital.
The Series approach mitigates this measurement problem by supplementing the infor-
mation on funds’ trading activities. Consider the periods when the fund chooses to pas-
sively manage more capital, which commonly involves less trading and a smaller fund
turnover. Such tilt towards passive management completely eludes from the FE approach
and RD approach, which assume an invariant trading behavior. In comparison, the Se-
ries approach can recognize the connection between passive management and low fund
turnover.32
In panel B of Table 1.3, the distributions of fund skill estimates are reported. Note
that the skill estimates for fixed-effects estimators (FE, RD1, and RD2) are cross-sectional
32Here is a concrete example of why allowing fund skill to be varying can make the returns to scale more
negative. Suppose a fund has an alpha of 10 basis point and manages $100 million. With a constant skill of
20 basis points, the implied returns to scale is  0.1 for every $100 million. If the skill can have a temporal
skill of 30 basis point, the implied returns to scale becomes  0.2 for every $100 million.
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data, while the skill estimates for Series estimator is panel data. FE and RD1 give similar
skill estimates, while RD2 produces higher skill estimates, especially in the right tail. This
upward shift in estimated skill when RD2 is employed is understandable since RD2 gives
a more negative bb, which conversely implies that, for the same level of alpha, a fund must
have a higher estimated skill to offset the performance punishment from fund size. Column
5 reports the skill percentiles from the Series approach. Compared to other estimators, the
Series estimator gives a less dispersed skill distribution: both the 10th percentile and 90th
percentile are closer to zero. The Series estimator has fewer remote estimates because it can
treat sporadic large deviations as cyclical peaks or troughs. In comparison, a fixed-effects
estimator estimates constant skill, which may be severely pushed away from zero by just a
few extreme observations.
[Insert Table 1.4]
It is also important to consider heterogeneity in b. In equilibrium, smaller funds tend to
have not only lower skills but also larger diseconomies of scale. In Table 1.4, I divide funds
into quartiles according to their time-series average fund size and apply the Series estimator
to each of the quartiles. A few findings emerge. First, smaller funds do have larger disec-
onomies of scale (reflected by more negative b). Second, there is a substantial amount of
heterogeneity in b: bb is -0.162 in the largest size quartile and is -23.643 in the smallest size
quartile — the magnitude increases by a factor of more than 70. Third, the bigger size quar-
tiles have higher mean skills and fewer negative-skill funds. This result is consistent with a
rational market in which low-skill funds have a smaller chance to grow large. Lastly, have
more dispersed skill distributions. Notice that the number of observations in each size quar-
tile is monotonically increasing. The higher dispersion may reflect the fact that lower size
quartiles contain more young or short-lived funds, whose skills are less precisely estimated.
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1.5.2 The Evolution of Industry Skill
This section presents one of the main results in this paper. I analyze the evolution of skills
in the active mutual fund industry. To put things in perspective, I also estimate skills using
the recursive-demeaning estimator (RD2) of (Zhu, 2018). Again, I divide funds into four
size quartiles and apply the RD2 estimator to each quartile.
I measure the skill of the industry with the value-weighted average fund skill. Notice
that it is also the capital share-weighted average of fund skills. Mathematically, let industry
skill at be defined as
at =
Nt
Â
i=1
aitsit , (1.21)
where ait is fund skill and sit is fund i’s share of industry capital, and Nt is the number of
funds at time t. For ease of discussion, I call my Series estimator the dynamic skill model
and Zhu’s recursive-demeaning estimator the constant skill model. Figure 1·1 shows the
time-series for industry skill estimates from these two models.
The long-term trends are the same. Industry skill increases over time, especially during
two periods — 1977 to 1990 and 2000 to 2010 — when the industry size rapidly grows.
After 2010, both models indicate a drop in industry skill.
[Insert Figure 1·1]
There are also noticeable differences between the estimated industry skills from these two
models. First, the industry skill from the dynamic skill model is estimated to be more
volatile because it allows for cycles in fund-level skills. In contrast, the constant skill model
estimates industry skill to be smooth. With constant skills, a rapid change in industry skill
requires either a dramatic redistribution of capital or a quick shift in industry demographics
— two events that seldom occur. Second, the industry skill from constant skill model is
more optimistic; it is about ten basis points higher than that from the dynamic skill model.
Two possibles reasons are behind this difference. On the one hand, the RD2 estimator gives
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more negative bb, which reversely gives higher skill estimates. On the other hand, a constant
skill can be easily biased upwards because of a few outliers of positive net alpha.
[Insert Table 1.5]
I also calculate the annualized growth rates of industry skill and present them in Table 1.5.
In particular, I pick a few influential dates in the mutual fund industry. 1977 is the start of
my sample, it is also the first year after the first S&P 500 index-tracking Vanguard fund is
introduced; 1981 is the year when 401k plan is introduced; from 1977 to 1993, mutual fund
industry grows rapidly and the industry spawn star managers like Peter Lynch, in 1993, the
first ETF is created; 2003 is follows the Dot-com bubble and is also the year of mutual fund
scandal, which leads to increased information disclosure and enhanced compliance proce-
dure of mutual fund as required by SEC; 2009 is the first year after the recent financial
crisis.
The industry skill growth rates are positive in all sample periods, except for the post-
crisis period 2009 - 2017 for constant skill model. The growth rate for the first half of the
sample (1977 to 1993) is higher than growth rates in the full sample. Although the twomod-
els produce very different growth rates in some periods, their whole sample growth rates
are similar. From 1977 to 2017, industry skill grows at a rate of more than 3% per annum.
Perhaps this growth is not surprising. As information about fund performance become
easily accessible, investors can allocate capital among surviving funds in a more effective
way. This implies that the increases in industry skill were either a result of a reallocation of
capital towards more skilled funds, or increases in average fund skill. I now examine these
possibilities.
To distinguish between these two sources of skill growth, I decompose the industry skill
in the following way. As shown by (Olley and Pakes, 1996), the following decomposition
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for industry skill at holds exactly:
at =
Nt
Â
t=1
(a¯t +Dait)(s¯t +Dsit)
= Nta¯t s¯t +
Nt
Â
t=1
DaitDsit
= a¯t +
Nt
Â
t=1
DaitDsit ,
(1.22)
where
Dait = ait  a¯t , Dsit = sit  s¯t ,
and a¯t and s¯t are the unweighted mean skill and unweighted mean share, respectively. The
first term in Equation (1.22) is the skill of an average fund, and the second term is the
sample covariance between fund skill and the share of industry capital in this fund. The
higher this covariance, the higher the share of capital that goes to more skilled funds and
the higher is the industry skill.
Figure 1·2 presents the decomposition from Equation (1.22). The first panel plots the
industry skill at , the second panel plots the times series of the unweighted mean skill a¯t ,
and the third panel plots the sample covariance between skill and capital.
[Insert Figure 1·2]
The unweighted mean declines over time; this deterioration indicates that an average fund
becomes less skilled.33 On the contrary, the covariance between skill and capital has in-
creased. This suggests there has been a reallocation of capital from less skilled to more
skilled funds. This reallocation of capital, and not an increase in average fund skill, is
behind the increase of industry skill.
Moreover, the allocation of capital has constantly improved before the recent financial
crisis. Investors are rational in the sense that they manage to allocate more capital to more
33In light of the growth in fund numbers during the same period, this drop in unweighted mean skill is
probably a result of many lowly-skilled entrants.
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skilled funds. However, it is still unclear whether their allocation closely matches the im-
plied allocation from the rational expectations equilibrium. I address this question in the
next section.
1.5.3 Capital Misallocation
I now study the capital misallocation in the active mutual fund industry. For each fund, I
measure capital misallocation with Equation (1.6). Recall that capital misallocation is the
difference between the investor’s allocation (average observed fund size) and the fund’s
capacity (average efficient fund size).
Figure 1·3 compares the density of average observed fund size to that of average effi-
cient fund size. For the expositional purpose, I exclude funds with zero average efficient
fund size in this graph. There is an evident difference. The efficient fund size has a much
larger standard deviation, while the observed size closely concentrates around $1,507 mil-
lion. In particular, the density of fund capacity has heavier tails. In the distribution of the
efficient fund size, 50% of the funds have more than $2532 million (75th percentile) or less
than $73 million (25th percentile). In the data, only 28.73% of funds fall into these two
regions. This gap reflects that investors neither reward nor penalize some funds adequately.
[Insert Figure 1·3]
In the top panel of Figure 1·4, I plot the distribution of misallocated capital (the abso-
lute value of misallocation). We do not differentiate between under-allocation and over-
allocation in this graph, but, with sophisticated investors, we expect to see a substantial
mass close to zero. This is not the case: the majority of misallocated capital lies far from
zero (with 25th percentile of $56 million and 75th percentile of $943 million). This distri-
bution suggests that investors misallocate a substantial amount of capital within the active
mutual fund industry. I will expand this point in a couple of ways.
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Is the active fund industry too large?
First, I examine whether the active mutual fund industry is too large. A large industry size
limits investors’ chance to benefit from active funds. When the active mutual fund industry
is too large, investors have to reduce the total allocation to it until some funds can generate
positive net alphas. On the other hand, if an average fund is under-allocated, a proportion
of funds in the industry can generate positive net alpha, giving sophisticated fund investors
the opportunity to outperform the benchmarks. In short, if the average fund is small relative
to its efficient size, investors can reallocate capital around funds to get positive net alpha.
I report the cross-sectional average capital misallocation within the active fund industry
in Table 1.6. In column 1, I present the results for the full sample. There are 4,186 funds
in the full sample and the weighted average mean misallocation (Equation (1.9)) and the
unweighted average mean misallocation (Equation (1.8)) are - $1.98 billion and - $1.46
billion, respectively. I also report the corresponding standard deviation, t-statistic, and
95% confidence interval of the mean. These two negative mean misallocations are statisti-
cally significant, and therefore I conclude that the industry has not reached its full capacity.
These two numbers appear large, given that the average fund size in my sample is $1.5 bil-
lion, but the magnitude of these numbers is misleading. Just as the distribution of fund size
is highly skewed, the distribution of the capital misallocation is also highly skewed. The
1st percentile is $ -24.33 billion, and the 10th percentile has quickly increased to $ -4.73
billion. Moreover, the median capital misallocation is positive ($29 million), suggesting a
higher-than-50% chance of investing in a fund that is expected to underperform. Indeed,
only 40% of funds in the full sample are under-allocated and expected to outperform their
benchmarks.
It is easy to show how the skewness in the distribution of capital misallocation can af-
fect the conclusion. In column 2 of Table 1.6, I exclude the bottom 10% in the distribution,
and one can see how quickly the numbers move towards zero. The ex-post mean capital
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misallocation and ex-ante mean capital misallocation become $ -0.04 billion and $ -0.00
billion, respectively, and both numbers are not statistically significant. The change of num-
bers suggests that taking out just a small fraction of funds in the distribution can lead to a
different conclusion — the industry has reached its capacity. Despite the existence of cap-
ital reallocation opportunities for a positive net alpha, this demonstration shows that such
opportunities are rare and hard to search.
In column 3, I exclude funds that have less than five years of data in my sample, cre-
ating a sub-sample (2,984 funds) whose capital misallocation is more precisely estimated.
The results are similar to those of full sample in column 1.
[Insert Table 1.6]
Overall, Table 1.6 suggests the following: positive-net-alpha opportunities exist in the in-
dustry, but they are hard to find. Consider a random sampling from the distribution of active
funds, only 40% of funds are under-allocated and imply a positive net alpha at their current
sizes. This number represents an unfavorable chance for investors to gain from investing in
active funds. I extend this idea of sampling a fund from the distribution in the next section.
Distribution of alpha opportunities
Active funds are expected to deliver zero net alpha at their efficient fund sizes. Capital
misallocation, a deviation from the efficient fund size, implies that a fund is expected to
deliver non-zero net alpha at its current size. Under-allocation implies the fund is too small
and therefore is expected to deliver positive net alpha at its current size; over-allocation in
contract implies the fund is expected to deliver negative net alpha. From the distribution of
capital misallocation, we can accordingly find the distribution of implied alpha opportuni-
ties in the active fund industry.
To calculate the implied alpha opportunities, consider the following argument. If the
efficient fund size of a fund is positive, the observed fund size qit and the efficient fund size
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bqeit differs due to a difference between investor belief µit and estimated fund skill bait+1. In
particular,
qit  bqeit = µit  bait+1bb .
Intuitively, investors over-allocate capital (qit > bqeit) when they overestimate fund skill
(µit > bait+1) and vice versa. Since µit is the conditional expectation of bait+1, their dif-
ference represents a bias in investor’s belief. Based on this argument, define the temporal
investor bias bgit as bgit = bb(qit  bqeit), (1.23)
and rewrite capital misallocationcMi as
cMi = bgibb , (1.24)
where bgi = T 1i TiÂ
t=1
bgit .
is the time-series average of temporal investor biases. It is clear from Equation (1.24) that
capital misallocation and investor bias linked through the unit cost of capital bb. Investor
bias is helpful in the sense that it converts capital misallocation (in dollar) into investors’
mis-estimation of fund skill (in return).
I use this conversion to calculate the implied alpha from the current fund size. In par-
ticular, under-allocation implies positive expected net alpha and negative investor bias;
investor bias is exactly the negative of implied alpha. For example, with the estimated bb of
0.333⇥10 6 (Table 1.3), an under-allocation of $1 billion corresponds to an investor bias
of -3.33 basis points and correspondingly an implied alpha of 3.33 basis points per month
at the current fund size.
[Insert Figure 1·4]
The bottom panel of figure 1·4 plots the distribution of alpha opportunities (negative in-
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vestor biases). It is worth pointing out that this is also the sampling distribution of fund
net alphas. If investors select a fund with positive potential alpha, they are expected to
profit from investing in that fund over a passive alternative. The distribution is highly right-
skewed34 with a mean of 48.8 basis points and a median -0.02 of basis points. The majority
of the implied alphas are negative, while the positive alpha opportunities reside in the long
right tail. To gain from investing in an active fund, investors can search a fund with positive
implied alpha, but a search cost would significantly deter them. For instance, a search cost
of 30 basis points, a probable amount suggested by other research,35 reduces the mean po-
tential alpha and median potential alpha to 18.8 bps and -19.0 bps, respectively, and leaves
investors merely 8.91% of probability to gain.36
Weak association between size and skill
To compare the efficient fund size with the observe fund size, I also sort funds into ten
groups according to their average net skills. I then calculate the cross-sectional weighted
means of observed fund size and efficient fund size in each group and plot the result in
figure 1·5. The solid line draws mean efficient fund size, while the dashed line corresponds
to mean observed fund size. The shaded bands indicate the 95% confidence intervals.
[Insert Figure 1·5]
Both fund sizes monotonically increase with skill. The positive association between fund
skill and the observed fund size indicates that investors manage to allocate more capital
to more skilled funds. This result is reminiscent of the positive covariance between size
and skill in the bottom panel of 1·2. However, this positive association is weaker than that
34For the expositional purpose, in the histogram, I drop the top 1% of observations, which go further to the
right.
35(Roussanov et al., 2017) find a mean search cost of 39 basis points; (Hortaçsu and Syverson, 2004) find
a mean search cost from 11 bps to 20 bps.
36The negative potential alpha is an avoidable alpha cost. However, it can be smaller than the avoidable
underperformance. When a fund has a negative skill, it generates net alpha even on the first dollar, e.g., -10
basis points; those 10 bps are also avoidable if investors switch to an index fund.
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implied by the equilibrium, as shown by the statistically significant difference between ob-
served fund size and efficient fund size. In high-skill groups (7 - 10), efficient fund size
is larger than the observed fund size. In these skill groups, investors under-allocate capi-
tal. On the other hand, investors over-allocate capital in low-skill groups (1 - 3), and the
observed fund size is larger than the efficient size. In particular, this graph shows that high-
skill funds are severely under-allocated. In skill group 10, the mean of efficient fund size
is $16.5 billion, while the mean of observed fund size is $6.4 billion.
[Insert Table 1.7]
To provide more granular information, I repeat the above calculation in size quartiles in
Table 1.7, in which I also report the difference between observed size and efficient size,
with its standard deviation reported in parenthesis. From the lower end of skill groups to
the higher end in each size quartile, the capital misallocation exhibits the same pattern as
in figure 1·2: over-allocation in low-skill groups and under-allocation in high-skill groups.
The observed fund size generally increases with skill in each size quartile, although
there are a few exceptions. In size quartile three, the mean of observed fund size in skill
group 6 is $430.18 million, while the mean is $414.75 million in skill group 10.
Finally, notice that the reported difference in Table 1.7 is also the average capital misal-
location in each sub-group. Recall that the average capital misallocation in the full sample
is -$1,975 million (Table 1.6). Only five out of forty (or 12.5% of) sub-groups in Table 1.7
have an average misallocation smaller than this number, and they concentrate in the right-
bottom corner of the table, corresponding to funds that are large and highly skilled. For
example, the average capital misallocaiton in size quartile 4 is -$20,129 million for skill
group 10 and -$12,431 million for skill group 9. Similar to Table 1.6, Table 1.7 suggests
that the majority of missing capital should go to a small fraction of funds. In addition to
that conclusion, Table 1.7 also helps to identify the small subset of severely under-allocated
funds; they are the large high-skill funds.
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Determinants of capital misallocation
The previous sections present evidence of capital misallocation, reflecting that the fund size
deviates from their equilibrium quantities. Fund size changes when fund flows in and out
of an active fund. This implies that the factors that result in irrational fund flows are likely
contributing to the inefficient fund size. I examine this possibility in this section.
Fund flows can be less responsive to fund performance due to a couple of reasons.
Equity funds can retain too much capital because investors under-penalize them for un-
derperforming market (See (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997) and (Goldstein et al., 2017)).
This attenuated response to underperformance is stronger for aged funds, with which only
performance-insensitive investors stay (Christoffersen and Xu, 2017). Moreover, investors
shun expensive funds (Barber et al., 2005), which accordingly can be under-allocated.
Therefore, fund age and fund expenses can be related to capital misallocaiton.
To investigate these possibilities, I use a scaled temporal misallocation as dependent
variable in the following. Define the measure UFundit as
UFundit =
bqeit qit
Sd(bqeit qit) , (1.25)
which is temporal under-allocation normalized by its time-series standard deviation; this
normalization shrinks the cross-sectional variation in fund size, making the distribution of
dependent variable less skewed. A positive UFundi,t suggests a temporal under-allocation
in period t and vice versa. I consider the panel data regression tests:
UFundit = di+dt +pSkillit + g0Xit + eit , (1.26)
where the main hypothesis is p = 0 — that is, fund skill is unrelated to capital misal-
location. If rational investors can timely learn fund skill, misallocation should not be
systematically associated with fund skill. I convert fund skill into units of basis points
(Skilli,t = 10000⇥cai,t) for ease of interpretation. The variables in Xit are controls. Model
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(1), (2), and (3) in Table 1.8 use Skilli,t as the only independent variable in various fixed-
effects specifications. The slope pˆ is highly significant in all specifications with increasing
model fit when more fixed effects are included. The first three models show that high-skill
funds are more likely to be under-allocated, which is consistent with what we found in the
size quartiles and skill groups. The slope in Model 3, where both time fixed effects and fund
fixed effects are included, indicates that a one basis point increase in fund skill skill on aver-
age lead to a 0.041 standard deviation increase in dollar amount of under-allocated capital.
[Insert Table 1.8]
Model (4) and Model (5) consider the effects of fund age and fund expense ratio. Fund
age has a negative and significant slope and negatively interacts with fund skill. It not
only induces capital over-allocation but also makes low-skill funds more likely to be over-
allocated. The negative interaction is consistent with the idea from (Christoffersen and Xu,
2017) that investors in older funds respond less to bad performance. These funds have
sticky investors who under-penalize. As for the expense ratio, a one basis point increase in
expense ratio on average leads to a 0.331 standard deviation increase in under-allocation.
This effect is strong, having a larger effect than fund skill. However, there is no interac-
tion effect between fund skill and expense ratio. Overall, the effect from the expense ratio
shows that investors have a naive aversion to fund fee; rational investors should care about
after-fee performance instead of responding to fee itself. Compared to fund skill, fund fee
is easily-accessible information that investors find easier to process (Barber et al., 2005),
and it does have a higher effect on under-allocation. Investors can easily ignore a high-skill
fund with a high expense. In both Model (4) and Model (5), the slope for Skillit is still
positive and significant.
Model (6) uses dummy variables HighSkillit and LowSkillit as controls, the former
equals 1 if Skilli,t is in the top quarter of skill cross-section at time t, while the latter
equals one if Skilli,t is in the bottom quarter. Reminiscent of my previous findings, high-
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skill funds tend to be under-allocated while the low-skill funds tend to be over-allocated.
However, even after controlling these two extreme groups, the slope coefficient of Skilli,t
is still positive and significant. Interestingly, the R2 for Model (6), which only includes two
dummy variables, is comparable to that of Model (5).
In summary, the regression results in Table 1.8 demonstrate that variables resulting in
irrational fund flows do contribute to capital misallocation, as they cause investors to allo-
cate capital based at least in part on influences other than fund performance.
1.5.4 Post-Misallocation Fund Performance
The previous section focuses on the cross-section of capital misallocation. This section
studies the time-series implication of capital misallocation.
The decreasing returns to scale imply a negative performance-to-size relationship for
mutual funds. Rational investors respond to fund performance by reallocating capital across
funds. They respond to positive net alpha by allocating more capital until they expect the
additional capital drives the net alpha below zero; conversely, they reduce allocation in
response to negative alpha until the fund is expected to deliver zero net alpha or exit the
market. In my model, I assume such capital reallocation happens quickly and the net alpha
is zero at the end of each period for every fund.37
In reality, capital reallocation takes time. In the short term, funds with good track
records only gradually increase in size so they can continue to outperform. These funds
are “under-allocated" because their actual sizes are smaller than their efficient fund sizes.
In contrast, some funds are “over-allocated," they generate negative alpha in the short-term
but, if the market is efficient, they will eventually exit or their sizes will shrink to a level
that is small enough for them to keep pace with their benchmarks.
37In this section, I refer to a fund as under-allocated if its observed fund size is smaller than the efficient
fund size in a particular period. In previous sections, an under-allocated fund correspond to a fund whose
observed fund size is smaller than the efficient fund size on average in time-series. The same rule applies to
over-allocated fund.
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So we should expect the following. Under-allocated funds generate significant positive
net alphas in the short-term, but these alphas do not persist. As more money flows in, these
net alphas become lower and lower until they are indifferent from zero. Conversely, over-
allocated funds generate significant negative net alpha in the short-term, but as liquidation
and share redemption take place, these funds catch up and have a higher and higher net
alpha until, again, their net alphas become indifferent from zero.
[Insert Figure 1·6]
Figure 1·6 studies this predicted time-series pattern. In the end of each month from 1977
through 2017, I classify funds into two value-weighted portfolios of over-allocated funds
and under-allocated funds. Figure 1·6 presents the average net alphas for these two port-
folios in each of the following 120 month (10 years). The shaded band represents the 95%
confidence interval.
Figure 1·6 shows an asymmetric market response to these two groups of funds. The
net alpha of under-allocated funds behave exactly as we expect: it is statistically positive
in the beginning and gradually declines over time until it becomes statistically indifferent
from zero after three years — the investors rationally respond to good performance. But
the times-series of net alpha for over-allocated funds suggest a market failure. The net
alpha is statistically negative initially but does not climb up to zero in subsequent periods.
Instead, it fluctuates around -10 basis points per month. These flat time series suggest that
these funds are always too large and that investors fail to respond rationally to their poor
performance. By simply reallocating capital to an index fund — which delivers zero net
alpha38 — investors would have been better off.
I should also point out that, even though the net alpha for under-allocated funds indi-
cates that the market is rationally moving capital around, it also demonstrates how slowly
the capital reallocation takes place. As a result, sophisticated investors can benefit from the
38Index funds charge fees too, but the fee is much lower. For example, Vanguard S&P 500 index fund
investor shares charge an annual fee of 14 basis points.
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slow erosion of positive net alpha. And this potential outperformance can help explain the
popularity of active mutual funds. Additionally, the asymmetric market response gives a
new perspective on the coexistence of two seemingly contradictory things — popularity of
active funds and underperformance of an average active fund.
The poor performance of active mutual funds used to be attributed to the lack of skills in
the industry — e.g., (Jensen, 1968), (Carhart, 1997), and (Fama and French, 2010). These
earlier papers, measuring fund skill with net alpha, implicitly assume constant returns to
scale in active management. When diseconomies of scale are taken into account, recent
papers instead found strong evidence of fund skill (See (Berk and van Binsbergen, 2015)
and (Pástor et al., 2015)). If additional capital reduces fund performance, the over-capacity
of the active fund industry can explain the negative net alpha of an average active fund.
And slow-learning can rationalize an over-allocation to active fund industry (Pástor and
Stambaugh, 2012). However, this explanation is silent about the cross-sectional variation
within the industry because it treats the industry as a single portfolio.
My study highlights the importance of studying capital misallocation within the indus-
try. In particular, in Section 1.5.3, I show that the industry can still grow in size if investors
can reallocate capital across funds. Therefore the underperformance of an average active
fund is a reflection of insufficient market efficiency. The underperformance of an average
fund can be understood by examining the long-term performance of active funds. Although
the under-allocated funds outperform in the short-term, their performance becomes indif-
ferent from zero in the long-run. On the other hand, the over-allocated funds underperform
persistently. The average performance of active funds in the long run, therefore, lags behind
passive benchmarks.
In the short run, capital misallocation provides an opportunity for investors to beat the
benchmark by searching under-allocated funds. This potential benefit from capital reallo-
cation can explain the popularity of active funds. Figure 1·6 shows that under-allocated
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funds continue to outperform their benchmarks until three years. The capital reallocation
is slow enough for sophisticated investors, who have the resources to search for informed
fund managers, to have higher returns than investing passively.
1.6 Conclusions
I document that investors misallocate a substantial amount of capital in the active mutual
fund industry. Despite a rising positive association between fund size and fund skill in the
past four decades, the observed fund size does not fully reveal which funds are skilled. My
results suggest that the median fund is over-allocated by $29 million, suggesting a less-
than-50% chance for investors to benefit from investing in an active fund. The average
capital misallocation is -$1,975 million, so the mutual fund industry can host more capital.
The additional capital should go to under-allocated funds. Searching for these funds is hard
but highly rewarding. In particular, I find the under-allocated funds can outperform their
passive benchmarks for three years.
In my study, 37% of funds have negative skills and should not have entered the market.
Although this result is consistent with findings in other recent papers that explicitly control
for the effects of scale, e.g., (Berk and van Binsbergen, 2015), the existence of these funds
is hard to reconcile within a rational expectations framework. Entry and exit of funds are
exogenous and therefore neglect the distortion therein. Having a model for the attrition
in the active fund industry can help understand why non-skill funds can retain capital, in
some cases, for an extended period. My identification strategy appears to require strong as-
sumptions, but these assumptions can be easily relaxed. To infer time-varying fund skills,
one can use more conditioning variables than just the fund turnover ratio. In this paper, I
choose to keep the model parsimonious and robust.
The apparent capital misallocation in the active fund industry may seem contradictory
to the competitiveness of this market. After all, millions of households and thousands of
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institutional investors make considerable efforts to find skilled managers. But it is con-
sistent with a market in which search is expensive. In (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980), the
authors demonstrate that a fully efficient market eliminates traders’ incentives to collect
costly information. A similar situation exists in the asset management market: If all funds
at all times are expected to generate zero net alpha, no investors have incentives to search
for funds (See, e.g., (Gârleanu and Pedersen, 2018)). Capital misallocation and the po-
tential reward for identifying it — especially the under-allocation — gives smart money
opportunities to beat the market by reallocating capital (See (Gruber, 1996) and (Zheng,
1999)). This benefit of participating in the active fund market also helps in explaining the
popularity of active management in spite of the industry’s poor track record. Incorporating
the necessary disequilibrium in the asset management market and re-examining investor
behavior while controlling for the heterogeneity in their sophistication can be a fruitful
venue for future research.
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Table 1.1
List of Vanguard Funds
These are the passive Vanguard funds served as benchmark funds for the estimation of fund
gross alpha.
Fund Name Ticker Asset Class Inception Date
S&P 500 Index VFINX Large-Cap Blend 08/31/1976
Extended Market Index VEXMX Mid-Cap Blend 12/21/1987
Small-Cap Index NAESX Small-Cap Blend 01/01/1990
Balanced Index VBINX Balanced 11/09/1992
Mid-Cap Index VIMSX Mid-Cap Blend 05/21/1998
Small-Cap Growth Index VISGX Small-Cap Growth 05/21/1998
Small-Cap Value Index VISVX Small-Cap Value 05/21/1998
Value Index VVIAX Large-Cap Value 11/13/2000
Note:
1. NAESX was introduced earlier but was originally not an index fund. It was converted to an index fund
in late 1989, so the date in the table reflects the first date it is included the fund in the benchmark set.
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Table 1.2
Descriptive Statistics
Gross return is the net return plus 1/12th of the annual expense ratio. Gross alpha (BvB) is
calculated using the methodology of (Berk and van Binsbergen, 2015), Gross alpha (FFC)
is calculated using the factor model of (Carhart, 1997).Net alpha (BvB) and Net alpha
(FFC) are estimated with fund net returns. AUM is the total net assets of mutual fund
adjusted by inflation and converted to the dollar value of January 2017. Turnover is the
reported fund turnover ratio in the fiscal yearend. FundAge is the number of years since the
fund’s first offer date. The data ranges from January 1977 through December 2017.
No.
fund/month
Percentiles
Mean Sd 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
Gross ret (%) 567,533 0.90 5.17 -14.46 -1.73 1.25 3.85 13.18
Net ret (%) 567,533 0.79 5.17 -14.58 -1.83 1.15 3.75 13.07
Gross alpha (BvB) (%) 567,533 0.07 1.91  5.14 -0.77 0.05 0.88 5.51
Net alpha (BvB) (%) 567,533  0.04 1.91  5.26  0.87  0.04 0.78 5.39
Gross alpha (FFC) (%) 567,533 0.03 1.97 -5.31 -0.86 0.01 0.89 5.59
Net alpha (FFC) (%) 567,533 -0.08 1.97 -5.43 -0.96 -0.08 0.79 5.48
AUM ($ mil of 2017 Dollars) 567,581 1,507 5,621 6 78 262 966 21,825
Expense ratio (%) 567,533 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.22
Turnover (%) 550,744 80.42 83.80 1 32 60.76 103 371
Turnover (standardized) 543,109 0.00 1.00  1.89  0.7  0.16 0.6 2.72
FundAge 567,533 14.68 13.75 0.93 5.50 10.59 18.67 68.27
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Table 1.3
Decreasing Returns to Scale and Fund Skill in Full Sample
This table estimates the regression rit = ait +bqit 1+ eit with different estimators, where
rit is fund gross alpha and qit 1 is lagged fund size. OLS stands for the ordinary least
square estimator, FE is the fixed-effects estimator, RD1 the recursive-demeaning estimator
from (Pástor et al., 2015), RD2 is the recursive-demeaning estimator from (Zhu, 2018),
Series represents the estimator developed in this paper. FundSize corresponds to the esti-
mate of b. The slope coefficient is timed by 106 to reflect the impact of $100 million on
fund performance in the unit of basis point per month. The numbers in the parentheses
are heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics clustered by fund ⇥ month for OLS and clustered
by fund for FE and RD specifications. Finally, the t-statistic for the Series estimator is
calculated with fund clustered-bootstrap of 1,000 replications. The omitted variable bias is
positive; the finite sample bias is negative. Panel B shows the distribution of the estimated
fund skill.
Estimator
OLS FE RD1 RD2 Series
Panel A: Decreasing Returns to Scale
FundSize (⇥106) 0.008 -0.088 -0.017 -0.675 -0.333
(0.97) (-3.85) (-0.33) (-3.09) (-5.21)
Constant 0.0006
(23.58)
Observations 563,428 563,428 554,861 559,144 535,329
Omitted Variable
Bias
Y N N N N
Finite Sample
Bias
N Y N N N
Time-Varying
Fund Skill
N N N N Y
Panel B: Fund Skill (%/month)
1st percentile   -1.10 -1.12 -1.09 -0.74
10th percentile   -0.35 -0.36 -0.33 -0.21
25th percentile   -0.13 -0.14 -0.11 -0.04
50th percentile   0.05 0.04 0.08 0.10
75th percentile   0.21 0.20 0.27 0.26
90th percentile   0.40 0.38 0.50 0.44
99th percentile   1.03 1.04 1.32 1.12
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Table 1.4
Decreasing Returns to Scale and Fund Skill in Size Quartiles
This table shows the estimation result using the series estimator developed in this paper for
regression rit = ait+bqit 1+eit , where rit is fund gross alpha and qit 1 is lagged fund size.
Funds are sorted into four quartiles according to their average fund size in the full sample.
Slope corresponds to the estimate of b. The t-statistic for series estimator is calculated with
clustered-bootstrap of 1000 replications. Slope coefficient is timed with 106 to reflect the
impact of $100 million on monthly fund performance in the unit of basis point.
Size
Quartile
Avg. AUM
( $ mil)
No.
Obs
Slope: b
(⇥106) t-statistic
Monthly Skill: ait(%)
Mean S.d. 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
1 37 82,931 -23.643 -5.07 0.03 0.38 -1.12 -0.14 0.06 0.23 1.02
2 131 115,410 -9.721 -2.61 0.16 0.33 -0.83 0.02 0.16 0.30 0.94
3 393 137,472 -1.662 -3.63 0.14 0.25 -0.51 0.01 0.13 0.27 0.80
4 3,093 199,496 -0.162 -6.43 0.20 0.24 -0.33 0.06 0.17 0.31 0.90
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Table 1.5
Industry Skill Growth Rates
This table shows the average annualized growth rate in industry skill for the corresponding
period. Industry skill is defined as the capital share weighted average of fund skills. The
numbers are in decimal. The dynamical skill model corresponds to the series estimator
developed in this paper; the constant skill model corresponds to the recursive-demeaning
estimator of (Zhu, 2018). The table divides the sample with a few influential years. 1977
is the start of my sample and the first year after the first S&P 500 index-tracking Van-
guard fund is introduced; 1981 is the year when 401k plan is introduced; 1993 is the year
when the first ETF is created; 2003 follows the Dot-com bubble and is the year of mutual
fund scandal, which leads to increased information disclosure and enhanced compliance
procedure of mutual fund as required by SEC; 2009 follows the recent financial crisis.
Time Period Dynamic Skill Model Constant Skill Model
1977 – 1980 0.1140 0.0465
1981 – 1992 0.0230 0.0682
1993 – 2002 0.0169 0.0099
2003 – 2008 0.0329 0.0115
2009 – 2017 0.0064 -0.0083
1977 – 1993 0.0502 0.0617
1977 – 2017 0.0313 0.0276
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Table 1.6
Capital Misallocation
For every fund in my database, I estimate the capital misallocation bWi defined in Equation
(1.6). The cross-sectional mean, standard error of the mean, t-statistic 95% confidence
interval, and percentiles are the statistical properties of this distribution. Percent with less
than zero is the fraction of the distribution that has misallocation less than zero (under-
allocation). The cross-sectional weighted mean, standard error of the weighted mean, and t-
statistic are weighted by the number of periods the fund exists. The 95% confidence interval
is calculated using the BCa bootstrap method with 10,000 replications. The numbers are
reported in January 2017 $billion.
Full
Sample
Exclude
Bottom 10%
Exist More than
Five Year
Cross-sectional weighted mean -1.98 -0.04 -2.05
Standard error of the weighted mean 0.12 0.03 0.12
t-statistic -17.12 -1.20 -16.51
Confidence Interval (-2.22, -1.76) (-0.09, 0.02) (-2.31, -1.82)
Cross-sectional mean -1.46 -0.00 -1.55
Standard error of the mean 0.09 0.02 0.09
t-statistic -16.88 -0.14 -16.87
Confidence Interval (-1.64, -1.30) (-0.04, 0.03) (-1.74, -1.39)
1st percentile -24.33 -4.00 -23.09
5th percentile -11.60 -1.93 -12.92
10th percentile -4.73 -0.86 -7.09
50th percentile 0.03 0.04 0.03
90th percentile 0.63 0.71 0.74
95th percentile 1.19 1.27 1.29
99th percentile 3.65 3.93 3.65
Percentage of less than zero 0.40 0.33 0.41
Number of funds 4186 3767 2984
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Table 1.7
Observed vs. Efficient Fund Size
The table reports the efficient fund size vs. the actual fund size in size quartiles and skill
groups. The parenthesis below Diff reports its standard deviation. The numbers are in
millions of 2017 Dollars. The funds are sorted in size quartiles according to their full-
sample average fund size and sorted into ten skill groups according to their full-sample
average skill.
Size
Quartile
Skill Group
1 (L) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (H)
1 Observed 31.71 32.94 39.44 37.25 41.60 41.84 44.86 44.11 45.85 36.71
Efficient 0.01 0.00 0.40 0.76 4.16 20.64 43.68 74.84 122.25 295.67
Diff 31.70 32.93 39.04 36.49 37.44 21.20 1.18 -30.73 -76.40 -258.97
(2.03) (2.25) (3.03) (2.94) (3.88) (2.97) (3.11) (3.03) (5.52) (16.51)
2 Observed 119.59 119.48 124.42 122.64 128.29 135.37 133.59 138.02 147.29 148.97
Efficient 0.06 0.20 0.69 3.27 10.28 53.30 113.01 189.26 290.76 637.43
Diff 119.53 119.28 123.72 119.37 118.01 82.07 20.58 -51.24 -143.47 -488.45
(8.47) (8.46) (8.37) (8.74) (9.04) (8.03) (5.10) (6.10) (9.55) (36.79)
3 Observed 327.87 363.51 376.97 373.62 397.65 430.18 430.10 417.82 437.32 414.75
Efficient 0.00 0.05 3.08 25.63 109.23 328.86 646.24 1,104.72 1,717.05 3,319.76
Diff 327.87 363.46 373.88 347.99 288.42 101.32 -216.14 -686.90 -1,279.73 -2,905.00
(26.80) (22.86) (23.31) (23.55) (20.53) (15.25) (20.51) (44.91) (76.27) (196.03)
4 Observed 1,354.71 1,589.63 1,853.74 1,668.75 2,076.36 2,268.67 2,837.32 3,089.53 4,968.70 13,511.06
Efficient 0.00 0.22 11.30 86.74 980.63 3,362.34 6,724.63 11,088.93 17,399.75 33,640.10
Diff 1,354.71 1,589.41 1,842.44 1,582.02 1,095.73 -1,093.67 -3,887.30 -7,999.40 -12,431.05 -20,129.04
Sd (202.36) (164.03) (259.00) (138.75) (142.80) (176.45) (248.50) (429.71) (654.03) (1,199.52)
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Table 1.8
Determinants of Capital Misallocation
This table presents results for panel data regression:
UFundit = di+dt +pSkillit + g0Xit + eit
where UFundit is defined as the efficient fund size minus actual fund size normalized by
its full sample standard deviation, and Skillit is the estimate of fund skill in the unit of
basis point, Xit represents control variables. FundAgeit is in unit of years, ExpenseRatioit
is in unit of basis point. HighSkillit and LowSkillit equals 1 if fund skill is the top and
bottom quarter of skill distribution of time t respectively. The numbers in the parentheses
are heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Skilli,t 0.014 0.044 0.041 0.040 0.061 0.049
(70.392) (4.754) (4.712) (4.673) (7.152) (13.050)
FundAgei,t -0.034 -0.012
(-10.708) (-3.008)
Skilli,t⇥FundAgei,t -0.001
(-8.267)
ExpenseRatioi,t 0.046 0.331
(6.099) (6.157)
Skilli,t⇥ExpenseRatioit 0.000
(0.876)
HighSkilli,t 0.093
(1.466)
LowSkilli,t -0.293
(-5.233)
R2 0.049 0.194 0.272 0.279 0.317 0.318
N 524,433 524,433 524,433 524,433 524,433 523,942
Fund FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Figure 1·1. Industry Skill
This figure shows the time-series of industry skill, measured as capital share weighted
average of fund skills; the unit is basis point per month. The solid line (dynamic skill
model) shows the estimated skill from the Series estimator developed in this paper (Section
1.3); the dotted line (constant skill model) shows the estimated skill from the recursive-
demeaning estimator of (Zhu, 2018).
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Figure 1·2. Decomposition of Industry Skill
This figure decomposes fund skill (top panel) into the unweighed mean skill (second panel)
and covariance between fund skill ait and fund share of industry capital sit (third panel).
This decomposition is exact. A higher covariance indicates a higher allocative efficiency,
indicating that more skilled funds can attract a larger share of industry capital.
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Figure 1·3. Efficient vs. Observed Fund Size Distribution
This figure presents the cross-sectional distribution of average efficient fund size and aver-
age observed fund size. Funds with zero efficient size are excluded from the distribution.
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Potential Alpha (Negative Investor Bias)
Log Misallocated Capital
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Figure 1·4. Misallocated Capital and Potential Alpha
This figure presents the cross-sectional distributions of misallocated capital (absolute value
of capital misallocation defined in Equation (1.6)) and fund potential alpha (negative of
investor bias bgi in Equation (1.24)). The misallocated capital is in January 2017 $million;
the potential alpha is in percentage.
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Figure 1·5. Efficient vs. Observed Fund Size Sorted by Skill.
This figure compares the means of the efficient fund size and the observed fund size (both
in millions of January 2017 Dollars). Funds are sorted into ten skill groups according to
their time-series average skills. In each skill group, I calculate the ex-post mean fund size,
where fund size is weighted by the number of periods a fund exists in my sample. Shades
represent 95% confidence intervals. Skill group 1 has the lowest skill.
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Figure 1·6. Post-Formation Net Alphas on Portfolios of Mutual Funds
Classified by Funding Status.
Each month funds are classified into value-weighted portfolios according to their sizes.
Under-allocated funds are funds whose actual fund sizes are smaller than their efficient fund
sizes; conversely, over-allocated funds have actual fund sizes larger than efficient sizes. The
lines in the graph represent the net alphas on the portfolios in the month subsequent to the
initial classification. Shades represent corresponding 95% confidence intervals.
Chapter 2
Active Sector Funds and Fund Manager Skill
2.1 Introduction
Investing in active mutual funds has been an uphill battle for many investors because the
performance of active funds is disappointing. On average, an active fund underperforms its
passive benchmark.1 Furthermore, excellent track records are no guarantee for tomorrow’s
success: most outperformers become average-performers in subsequent periods (Carhart,
1997).
Why do funds underperform, and why do outperformers have little persistence? One
explanation is diseconomies of scale (Chen et al., 2004; Berk and Green, 2004): As fund
size increases, a fund’s ability to outperform its benchmark declines.2 In an efficient mar-
ket, investors respond to a fund’s outperformance by giving it more assets, which increases
the size of the fund. Eventually, funds become too large to beat the market, losing outper-
formance potential.
Sometimes, though, investors are less responsive; they give too little capital to some
past outperformers. These outperformers can thus continue to beat their benchmarks. Since
investors allocate capital across funds, these past outperformers with too little capital are
under-allocated. This paper studies the performance of a group of active funds that are
ex-ante under-allocated: active sector funds. We develop and analyze a simple investment
1See (Jensen, 1968), (Malkiel, 1995), (Fama and French, 2010), among others.
2 The negative relationship between fund size and fund performance is well known among practitioners.
For example, Warren Buffett concluded “A fat wallet, however, is the enemy of superior investment results."
(see Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letter 1994)
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strategy with active sector funds.
Figure Panel A of Figure 2·1 charts the cumulative portfolio value of $1,000 initial in-
vestment in active sector funds with equal weights — which we refer to as Equal-Weighted
Sector (EWS) strategy — and in the S&P 500 index from 1998 to 2016; Panel B shows
the drawdown of the EWS strategy compared to S&P 500 index. Table 2.1 documents the
annual return comparison between the EWS strategy and S&P 500 index.3 Figure 2·1 and
Table 2.1 demonstrate that a simple equal-weighted indexation of active sector funds sig-
nificantly outperforms the market. They also suggest that manager skill in active mutual
fund industry might be largely under-appreciated.
[Insert Figure 2·1 and Table 2.1 ]
Absent security selection and market timing, the EWS strategy produces reliable pos-
itive net alpha. It matches market exposure (market beta around one) while other factor
exposures are largely zero, so it effectively tracks the market.4 Further analysis using in-
vestable benchmarks as risk factors reveals economically and statistically stronger result
for the EWS strategy’s outperformance.
The under-appreciated skill and the efficient diversification, in fact, prove to be two
equally important pillars in explaining the seemingly surprising outperformance of EWS
strategy.
On the one hand, investors under-appreciated the skills in active sector funds and, as
3The sector-based approach assumes that returns vary across industries and time so that sectors provide
risk premiums to investors that differ from the market risk premium. Academic research supports the idea
that sector allocation serves as important consideration to active managers. (Kacperczyk et al., 2005) find
the investment skill is more evident among managers who hold portfolios concentrated in a few industries.
(Cavaglia et al., 2000) find industry factors dominate country factors and should be important inputs
for active managers of global equity portfolios. (Roll, 1992) finds industry structures can help explain
differences in international stock index returns.
Industry factors/risks are widely accepted by practitioners (see, e.g., Barra’s Integrated Model, North-
field’s Global Equity Risk Model, Morningstar’s Global Risk Model, which all recognize sector/industry
exposures). Ibbotson Associates publishes industry risk premium data in its annual Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and
Inflation (SBBI) Yearbook.
4Although only a handful sector funds have significant positive alphas in our sample, the EWS strategy
benefits from diversification of active risk, which results in a higher information ratio.
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a result, gave these funds insufficient capital. The lack of capital then implies that the
diseconomies of scale have not completely erased the alphas generated from these funds.
Investors may under-fund active sector funds for a couple of reasons. First, sector funds
are considered alternative investments and are not well-known to many investors. Second,
conventional wisdom suggests that investing in a single sector is risky due to insufficient
diversification. Third, sector funds are hard to benchmark, and therefore investors find
it difficult to interpret their performances. Indeed, as we show in this paper, most active
sector funds are too small. Moreover, managers of active sector funds are more likely to
have skills. They develop domain knowledge about a narrow universe of firms with similar
business operations. Therefore they could more easily identify the winners and losers in
their target sectors.
On the other hand, the efficient diversification enables the EWS strategy to deliver
consistent and reliable outperformance, as demonstrated by both Figure 2·1 and Table 2.1.
There are two layers of diversification at place. At the systematic risk level, putting together
funds with different risk exposures reduces the sector-specific risk. As we invest in all
sectors/industries, we re-construct the broad market universe and the EWS turns out to
be resilient to bubble bursts and market downturns. In particular, it has both shorter and
shallower drawdowns.
The EWS strategy diversifies active risk. Different sector/industry fund managers often
target non-overlapping universes of stocks, and therefore their active bets are uncorrelated.
For this reason, the alphas, which stem from the manager’s active bets, will also be lowly
correlated. As a result, investing in a portfolio of orthogonal active funds could quickly
suppress the volatility of the portfolio’s alpha and raises the portfolio’s information ratio.
Finally, this dual play of under-appreciated skill and efficient diversification can in-
form other portfolio strategies of active funds. Hence we also develop an alpha-arithmetic,
which formalizes and generalizes the principles that underpin the success of our simple
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EWS strategy.
Our work relates to three lines of research. Notably, recent studies find strong evidence
of both skills and diseconomies of scale in active management; see (Pástor et al., 2015)
and (Berk and van Binsbergen, 2016).5 Active funds on average can outperform the market
and active management is not necessarily a zero-sum game (Pedersen, 2018). But an active
fund, regardless of its skill level, would return zero net alpha in an efficient market (Berk
and Green, 2004). A persistent outperformance requires the fund size to not have reached
its equilibrium quantity. And this inequilibrium does exist in the market due to various
frictions.6 We thus look for ex-ante under-allocated funds to put in a portfolio.
In a different vein, (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999) find significant alpha from in-
vesting in the past top-performing industry portfolios. Obviously, some industries tend to
outperform others for some period of time. Although these outperforming industries (or
sectors) are easily discernible ex post, we do not assume that investors can predict the fu-
ture outperformers. Moreover, a potentially high turnover ratio and associated transaction
costs could limit the portfolio’s performance. Therefore, our portfolio contains every sector
and does not tilt weights towards any industry.
Finally, (DeMiguel et al., 2007) show that the naive diversification (1/N rule) is an
effective allocation scheme. Comparing the out-of-sample performance of 14 optimal port-
folio models across seven empirical datasets, the authors show that none of the theoretically
sound models perform consistently better than the naive 1/N rule. They argue that poor esti-
mation of expected returns impedes out-of-sample performance of portfolios. We establish
that an equal-weighted portfolio of active funds can substantially diversify risks.
5(Berk and van Binsbergen, 2016) show that on average active managers add 3 millions per year in value
in a sample of 5,974 funds from January 1977 to March 2011.
6This could happen due to a couple of reasons. First, investors can be slow-learners of the negative
impacts of fund size on fund performance (Pástor and Stambaugh, 2012). Second, marketing and costly
search can distort information and cause investors to overlook good funds (See (Sirri and Tufano, 1998),
(Roussanov et al., 2017), and (Goldstein et al., 2017)). Finally, investors tend to react more to salient
information such as fund fees (Barber et al., 2005) and hence can be less responsive to fund performance.
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2.2 Data
Our studies examines a group of sector funds that are actively managed and span most sec-
tors. Only actively managed funds have the potential to carry a component of managerial
skill, and a full coverage sectors and industries provides better diversification and allows us
to conclude that the results are not driven by a subset of sectors or industries. A few other
criteria also come to mind. First, we require all the sector funds to reside under a single
fund family. This allows us to control for the organizational diseconomies of scale in active
fund management industry (Chen et al., 2004). Second, we only consider mutual funds,
which face tighter regulatory scrutiny and report audited performance. Third, we prefer
older funds, so that we have longer data sample for analysis and initiation or selection bias
is limited. Last, we prefer a fund family whose sector classification is finer, which makes it
more likely for fund managers to have specialized knowledge that adds value to her invest-
ment process. Given these criteria, we identify forty sector funds from Fidelity (for a list of
fund tickers and sectors, see Appendix A.5). There are no reliable substitute for these forty
funds. Most sector funds are passively managed ETFs. Among the active sector funds, Van-
guard offers a much smaller number (some of them have overlapping targeting sectors, and
most of them are not initiated until 2004). T.Rowe Price and American Century each pro-
vide less than five sector funds. Notably, our sample selection strategy is similar to that of
(O’Neal, 2000), who confirms results in (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999) for mutual funds.
The monthly return data of active sector funds range from September 1998, to June
2016.7 As benchmarks, we include the S&P 500 index and ten passively managed sector
ETFs from SPDR, which are constructed in such a way that their underlying stocks recon-
stitute S&P 500 index.8 The monthly return data for SPDR sector ETFs start from January
7We have checked all merged funds in Fidelity during our sample period and found only one merge of
sector/industry funds during that period. Furthermore, the deprecated fund outperformed the benchmarks
before the merge. Meanwhile, no sector funds were merged into non-sector funds; no non-sector funds were
merged into sector funds either.
8S&P 500 and Russell 2000 are the two most common benchmarks for US mutual funds. We choose
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1999, and end at June 2016.
To examine factor exposures, we employ three linear asset pricing models: (1) the
five-factor model from (Fama and French, 2015); (2) the four-factor model from (Carhart,
1997); and (3) the investable-index four-factor model proposed by (Cremers et al., 2013).9
The Fama-French factor data and momentum factor data of Carhart model are taken from
Ken French’s website and span the same period as the sector funds. The index-based factor
model data are taken from Antti Petajisto’s website with data coverage from September
1998 to December 2013.
2.3 Equal-Weighted Sector (EWS) Strategy
The EWS strategy is simple: invest in equal weights among a group of actively managed
sector funds and rebalance to keep constant weights. While it is easy to implement and
provides satisfactory return at first glance, we need to address some practical issues. First,
funds have expenses (including management fee, 12B-1 fee etc.) and early redemption fees
if frequent rebalancing is needed. These costs will limit the superiority of EWS strategy.
Second, rebalancing is akin to synthetic short-volatility position (out-of-money put writ-
ing) that could increase tail risk in downturns. Third, its risk exposure might reveal results
are due to a certain value-size-momentum tilt, which enables it to benefit from alternative
betas. In that case the higher return of EWS is a result of higher or alternative risks. This
section investigates these issues.
S&P 500 because it has a higher explanatory power for out strategy’s return — S&P 500 index alone could
account for 92% variations in the EWS strategy. This approach of choosing benchmark, when it is unknown,
as the investable index closest to a portfolio’s return, is advocated by (Berk and van Binsbergen, 2015) and
also used by (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009).
9We use CPZ’s four-factor version (IDX4) that replaces size factor with the return differences between
the Russell 2000 and S&P 500 and and the value factor with the differences between the Russell 3000 Value
and Growth indices.
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2.3.1 Trading EWS with Cost
The first issue is if annual fees, including 12b-1 fees, management fees, administrative
fees, etc., eat up a majority of benchmark-adjusted return of EWS. We collect the annual
expense ratios of the active sector funds in our sample and use their mean as expense ratio.
Admittedly, by taking the mean we assume the EWS keeps its equal-weighting most of the
time during the year. But we also do not see much dispersion in expense ratios, because
funds are from the same fund family. Hence averaging expense ratios is reasonable. Table
2.1 gathers the results in the last two columns. A clear trend emerges from the expense ratio
column. Over time, the expense ratio of EWS has been declining and has settled to 81 basis
points recently. This is a reflection of the asset management industry’s effort to reduce its
charge, especially for active funds, who are striving to keep their fees low to compete with
low-cost passive funds. On a going-forward basis, we have no strong reason to believe the
expense ratio will spike in the future.
The last column reports after-fee excess returns. Because the expense ratios in column
5 are generally low compared to the excess return in column 4, we see little change. In only
4 of 19 years EWS does worse than the S&P 500 index (or 5 years if we deduct fees).10
The 2006 underperformance is small, and becomes negligible when expenses for passive
funds are also taken into account.11 Because passive funds also charge fees, our reported
net excess returns are lower than they should be. A t test shows the outperformance of
EWS is statistically significant both before fees (t statistic 3.69) and after fees (t statistic
3.09).
The numbers in Table 2.1 assume monthly rebalancing for the EWS strategy. That
rebalancing frequency may appear too high to some investors, especially when the trans-
10In 2006, the before-fee excess return is 75 basis point, while the after-fee excess return is negative 27
basis points.
11For example, it will cost the investor 18 basis points to invest in Vanguard’s S&P 500 tracking fund in
2006, that narrows down the underperformance to 9 basis point. Vanguard’s S&P 500 tracking ETF, which
has a even lower expense ratio of 4 basis points, is not available to investors until late 2010.
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action costs are not accounted for in the expense ratio. As a matter of fact, there are no
transaction fees involved with buying these funds. However, investors still need to pay
some short-term trading or redemption fees. Therefore, we consider whether it is plausible
to rebalance in a lower frequency, say rebalance at each quarter, as many passive funds do,
or rebalance at each year. Such infrequent rebalancing eliminates most of the short-term
redemption fees and will benefit investors even if there are additional transaction fees. We
consider rebalancing frequencies in Table 2.3.
[Insert Table 2.3]
Specifically, we examine four rebalancing frequencies, monthly, quarterly, yearly, and
never. The last case corresponds to a buy-and-hold EWS strategy in which the funds are
bought with equal weights at the beginning but are never rebalanced. For now, we focus
on the outputs for EWS and EWS   S&P 500 only, and we explain later the role of SSE
(SPDR Sector ETF).
The table reveals two messages. First, the cumulative return of investing in EWS or a
long-short portfolio of longing EWS while shorting S&P 500 index (essentially this is the
cumulative outperformance of EWS) is fairly insensitive to the rebalancing frequency. The
buy-and-hold generates the smallest cumulative return, which is not surprising, because the
weights drift over time and we lose the efficient diversification. But the numbers for the
other rebalancing frequencies are close. This means the investor could choose to rebalance
in a much slower fashion if she wishes to reduce or eliminate short-term redemption fee.12
Second, the average annual returns for EWS and EWS   S&P 500 are both statistically
significant across all rebalancing frequencies. That is, the outperformance of EWS strategy
is robust to rebalancing frequency used.
We next address the question whether an 1/N portfolio of indexed or passive sector
12In untabulated results, we find the EWS strategy’s fund weights do not change much over time. Because
there are forty funds in our strategy and their initial weights are 2.5%, it is hard for the weight of any
particular fund to dominate.
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funds (i.e, ETFs) can deliver the same result. If it does, then investors are better off in-
vesting in a purely passive portfolio due to its lower cost. It also could mean our results
so far are driven by different weighting, i.e. equal-sector weighting, to get an alternative
performance. To this end, we consider trading EWS strategy using passive sector ETFs
provided by SPDR. Nine out of ten of these sector ETFs are initiated in the end of 1998 —
this coincides with the time when MSCI and Standard & Poor’s developed Global Indus-
try Classification Standard (GICS) as a standard to classify stocks in different sectors and
industries. The last ETF for Real Estate is initiated in late 2015, after GICS was updated
to include a Real Estate sector. The ten SPDR sector ETFs track ten S&P Select Sector
Indices, which are constructed in such a way that their underlying stocks reconstitute S&P
500 index. Given our choice of benchmark, i.e. S&P 500 index, these tradable sector ETFs
are the best candidates to demonstrate what an equal-sector strategy with passive invest-
ment vehicles could deliver.13 We call this equal-sector strategy with indexed investments
SSE (SPDR Sector ETF).
Table 2.3 considers two cases: (1) SSE’s outperformance relative to S&P 500; and (2)
EWS’s outperformance relative to SSE. The former will demonstrate what equal-sector
weighting alone could deliver. The latter will inform us of whether equal-weighting could
explain the outperformance of EWS. Indeed, Panel A shows that SSE outperforms S&P
500, while it underperforms EWS across all rebalancing frequencies. This means equal-
weighting alone is not able to explain all of the outperformance of EWS. Again, results
are similar across rebalancing frequencies, except for the buy-and-hold strategy. A closer
look at Panel B reveals that the outperformance of SSE relative to S&P 500 is statistically
significant, while the statistical significance of EWS   SSE is weaker. For the latter one,
we still marginally reject the null hypothesis of no outperformance at 5% level, except for
the case of buy-and-hold, which is insignificant statistically. Although lack of more data
13ALPS Financial Services provides an equal-sector ETF with ticker EQL that does the same thing. How-
ever, it’s not initiated until mid 2009, and it rebalances the SPDR sector ETFs at each quarter. We want to
have enough data coverage and consider different rebalancing frequency.
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limits the statistical power, we do not want to overstate statistical significance. Yet, the
sizable cumulative return of EWS   SSE underscores the unexplained economic signifi-
cance. Overall, our results indicate the equal-sector weighting alone does not account for
the outperformance of EWS. Finally, Panel C shows the turnover of EWS and SSE, the
results shown that both strategies require limited turnover at a comparable level across all
rebalancing frequencies. Notably, both quarterly and monthly turnover could be further
decreased by reasonable bounds around target weights.
Overall, the EWS strategy’s outperformance is significant and is not sensitive to re-
balancing frequency. Quarterly or yearly rebalancing best balances its benefits against
transaction costs and portfolio turnover.
2.3.2 Risk of Rebalancing
The second issue is the strategy’s periodical rebalancing to equal weights increases tail
risk during market downturns. Buying past losers and selling past winners is like writ-
ing out-of-money calls and puts for winners and losers, respectively, and hence creates a
synthetic short on volatility (Ang, 2014). This short-volatility nature might entail an am-
plified downside risk (due to the synthetic out-of-money put positions) compared to value-
weighted market indices. Through various examinations, we show EWS actually performs
better during market turmoils: it has shorter and shallower drawdowns, and it earns a higher
average benchmark-adjusted return during down markets.
In Table 2.4, we take three different approaches to examine the downside risk for EWS
strategy. Panel A compares the drawdowns of EWS with S&P 500 index during two of
the well-known distressed periods in our sample, i.e., the Dot-com bubble and the Great
Recession. We consider the maximum drawdown, the drawdown duration and the time to
recovery. The drawdown duration is the time difference between the time of most recent
peak prior to the maximum drawdown and the time of first recovery to this peak (i.e., the
time to recovery is time difference between the time of maximum drawdown to first time of
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recovery to former peak). They provide slightly different sense of how persistent a severe
drawdown could be. In both cases, EWS has shallower and much shorter drawdowns. For
a visualization of this result, see Panel B of Figure 2·1.14
[Insert Table 2.4]
Panel B considers EWS returns in panic states. Similar to (Daniel and Moskowitz,
2016), we define a given month as bear market when the trailing two-year cumulative re-
turn of S&P 500 is negative, and bull market otherwise. This measure captures the two
aforementioned distressed periods and is more flexible. Consistent with our definition,
both EWS and S&P 500 index earn a lower average monthly return in bear market. A
closer inspection, however, reveals that EWS’s relative performance to S&P 500 index is in
fact better during bear market than during bull market. This additional benchmark-adjusted
return shows EWS is a hedge for the value-weighted index like S&P 500. After all, con-
trarians trade against momentum followers, they are natural hedge for each other.
To make sure the result is not confounded by change of systematic risk exposure during
the bear market, we consider a bear market timing regression, where we regress the excess
return of EWS (over one-month T-Bill rate) on the excess return of S&P 500 index in Panel
C:
ReEWS,t = a+aBIB,t 1+(b+bBIB,t 1)ReSPX,t + et
where the IB,t 1 is the ex-ante bear market indicator which equals to 1 in bear market and
0 otherwise. aB and bB are bear alpha and bear beta respectively: they are supposed to
capture the additional outperformance and risk-exposure for EWS in bear market. Similar
to results in panel B, EWS earns a bear-alpha, and has a negligible bear beta, both are not
statistically significant. The high R2 indicates our specification has good explanatory power
14In untabulated results, we examine further the returns of EWS if we exclude bubble industries during year
2000 and year 2009 (i.e., dot-com bubble and financial crisis). The lower EWS returns suggest that avoiding
bubble industries (or “efficient diversification” as suggested by an anonymous referee) does not fully explain
its outperformance.
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for the variation of EWS’s return.
In contrast to above-mentioned concerns, we find the EWS strategy provides down-
side protection.15 This could arise from three sources. First, the equal-weight rebalanc-
ing makes EWS more of a contrarian strategy that alleviates the impacts of market runs.
Second, the low turnover ratio of EWS in Panel C of Table 2.3 implies the synthetic short-
volatility position is small and hence its impact is also limited. Third, managers of the
underlying fund might have skills to take less risk during market downturns.
2.3.3 Factor Exposure of EWS
Finally, a third concern is that the EWS strategy generates more return by taking more
risks. More specifically, EWS’s performance might be explained by an alternative-beta ex-
posure. Anticipating, different factor exposures do not explain EWS’s performance either.
To examine the risk profiles of EWS strategy and its underlying funds, we utilize linear as-
set pricing models. We choose three factor models from existing literature, the five-factor
model from (Fama and French, 2015), the four-factor model from (Carhart, 1997), and the
index-based four-factor model from (Cremers et al., 2013).16
While Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) factors are calculated from factor mimicking port-
folios, they do not represent actual investable alternatives available to investors, nor do they
represent passively managed benchmark portfolios.17 (Cremers et al., 2013) suggest that
FFC model could produce biased evaluation of fund performance. They propose a four-
factor index-based factor model, which uses the returns of different indices to replace the
15In unreported analysis, we have examined the skewness of EWS strategy. We find that EWS and S&P
500 have a similar skewness. And the S&P 500 adjusted return of EWS strategy has positive skewness.
Therefore, additional negative skewness is hardly a significant source of return for EWS strategy.
16Fama-French five-factor model and Carhart four-factor model have three common factors, namely market
factor (MKT), size factor (SMB) and value factor (HML) from (Fama and French, 1996). Beyond these
three factors, Fama-French five-factor model introduces two more factors: profitability factor (RMW) and
investment factor (CMA); Carhart four-factor model, on the other hand, features a momentum factor (UMD).
Carhart’s model is the most widely used one for fund performance attribution.
17(Berk and van Binsbergen, 2015) argue also that FFC factor mimicking portfolios are much better in-
vestment opportunities than what is available to investors, instead, index funds should be used as benchmark
portfolios.
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factors in Carhart model. CPZ model uses S&P 500 index minus one-month T-Bill rate
to replace MKT factor, return difference between Russell 2000 index and S&P 500 index
to mimic SMB, and return difference between Russell 3000 Value index and Russell 3000
Growth index as alternative to HML factor. Finally, CPZ keeps the UMD factor.
[Insert Table 2.5]
Table 2.5 shows regression results for monthly-rebalanced EWS returns on three sets
of factors. In panel A, we use CAPM, Fama-French five-factor and the Carhart four-factor
model, these are the common factor models in the Fama-French-Carhart (FFC) methodol-
ogy. The surprisingly high R2’s suggest that factor risk premiums explain almost all the
variations of monthly return of our strategy. Because our strategy is an equal weighted
index of a pool of active funds, we believe this reflects that more and more active managers
are using factor models to manage their risk exposures.
Our relative small data sample might concern readers. To demonstrate that our results
of statistical significance are credible, we consider three different estimators of standard
errors for beta and alpha. The first is ordinary least squares (OLS) standard errors, which is
used by academics and practitioners. Assuming i.i.d residuals, OLS gives good estimates
in large samples. Some authors use White standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity,
we use Newey West standard errors from (Newey and West, 1994) to control for both het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation as second estimator. Finally, we use the pairwise block
stationary bootstrap method of (Politis and Romano, 1994) with 10,000 bootstrap samples
to estimate the standard errors. Hence we report three different t statistics underneath
each coefficient estimate for beta and alpha.
Our results in Panel A of Table 2.5 are similar to those from (Fama and French, 2010),
where authors consider the equal weighted portfolio of all actively managed U.S. equity
mutual funds. Among all the six factors, market factor (MKT) has an overwhelming large
explanatory power. CAPM, using only market factor as explanatory variable, has a corre-
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sponding R2 of 0.94, meaning that most of the variation of our strategy’s return is captured
by MKT. The beta estimate for MKT is close to 1.0, reinforcing our argument that our strat-
egy closely tracks the market. To get a clearer picture, we report the t statistic of whether
MKT beta is different from 1.0 in the table. The betas for other factors are statistically
but not economically significant, accounting for little return variation of our EWS strategy.
This is validated by the marginal increment of R2 with inclusion of other factors — R2 is
0.95 in both Fama-French five-factor model and Carhart four-factor model, compared to R2
of 0.94 in CAPM.
The current factor risk profile coincides with our previous discussion: the strategy es-
sentially has a one to one exposure to the market while has little, if not zero, tilt towards
the other risk factors — this allows the strategy to keep pace with the overall market, which
is what one would achieve by simply investing in an index-tracking passive fund. The al-
most zero tilt towards other factors also support our argument that the alternative weighting
is not driving the result. In that case the weighting would change the factor tilts towards
alternative betas. Beyond that, the strategy earns Jensen’s alpha from managers’ skills in
underlying funds. Alpha estimates are positive for both Fama-French model and Carhart
model, and is statistically significant for Carhart model using all three different standard
error estimators.
One might wonder why the annual, benchmark-adjusted return of 5.70%, or equiva-
lently 46 basis points per month, drops to a Carhart alpha of 22 basis points. Apart from
economically insignificant exposure to other factors, this is because it uses as market factor
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted excess return, which has
outperformed S&P 500 index during our sample period.18 This bias leads to underestima-
tion of risk-adjusted performance.
18CRSP index includes not only U.S. common stocks, but also non-U.S. firms, closed-end funds, real estate
investment trusts (REITs), and other securities such as shares of beneficial interest (SBIs). (Cremers et al.,
2013) use sample from 1980 to 2005, during which the S&P 500 outperformed CRSP index, and they report
a positive alpha for S&P 500 index.
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Panel B follows (Cremers et al., 2013) and (Berk and van Binsbergen, 2015) and uses
investable indices as factors. These indices are investable through their index-tracking
passive funds, and are better reflections of investor’s investment opportunity set. We first
use the excess return of S&P 500 index relative to one-month T-Bill as a single factor. S&P
500 index is the most common benchmark for US equity fund, so this single factor model
serves as a reasonable starting point. The results for S&P 500 index are consistent with
our results in Table 2.1. The return of S&P 500 index alone could explain 92% of return
variation in EWS strategy, with a statistically significant monthly alpha of 37 basis points.
The CPZ model, taken from (Cremers et al., 2013), includes the return difference of Russell
2000 index and S&P 500 index (R2-S5) and return difference of Russell 3000 Value index
and Russell 3000 Growth index (R3V-R3G) as investable substitutes of SMB and HML.
The results strengthen our argument. First, the high R2 of 0.95 shows that CPZ model has
the same level of explanatory power as compared to FFC models. Second, the alpha is both
positive and statistically significant. Third, the statistically significant R2-S5 beta of 0.30
shows our strategy slightly tilts towards small-size stocks. This moderate tilt towards small-
size stocks is not surprising, as EWS overweights sectors with smaller capitalizations.
Notice the difference between Panels A and B of Table 2.5. Most fund performance
can be factorized by common factor models; after all, these factors do a good job to ex-
plain the cross-sectional variation of stocks, and any portfolio is simply a repackaging of
underlying stocks if there is no managerial skills. In addition, common factors have been
widely used by fund mangers for risk management purposes. These reasons make it easy
to factorize a fund’s returns, but it does not necessarily indicate any fund’s returns could be
easily replicated. Just as the case for index-tracking funds, there are tracking errors when
trading factors. Matching a desired factor exposure is often hard from scratch, it usually
involves simultaneously buying and selling hundreds of stocks, which causes large transac-
tion costs. In performance assessment, factor models based on factor mimicking portfolios
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are a conservative detector for alphas and skill.
Finally, we draw a few conclusions from Table 2.5. First, the statistically significant
alpha shows the alternative beta exposure is not able to explain EWS’s outperformance.
Second, the close-to-one market beta and close-to-zero tilt towards other factors show that
the strategy’s systematic risk is similar to that of an index-tracking fund. Third, the high
R2’s suggest there is little evidence that EWS outperforms the market by deviating from
it, fund selectivity and activity is hardly a main contributor to the bulk of return. This last
point is consistent to the passive nature of EWS.
2.4 Alpha Arithmetic of EWS
How can a passive portfolio of active funds outperform the market, although the investor
forgoes both security selection and market timing at her level? To understand the mechan-
ics of passive portfolios of active funds, we consider a simple model. Let ai = fi+ ei be
the alpha of fund i from a factor asset pricing model, with mean fi and an error term ei for
i = 1, ...,N funds, whose mean is 0 and variance is s2i . Assume that alpha is idiosyncratic
to a fund, that is, the correlation of ai and a j is 0 if i 6= j. Allowing some approximation
error, we can write the alpha of EWS strategy as
aEWS = f+ e
where f= N 1Âifi is the cross-sectional average of fi, and e is an error term with mean 0
and variance s2 = N 2Âis2i = N 1s2e , in which s2e denotes the average variance of error
terms. The t statistic of aEWS is
taEWS = f/s=
p
T (IREWS)
where T is the number of sample periods and IREWS is the information ratio of the EWS
strategy.
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For a large number of funds N, diversification reduces risk, ds/dN < 0, and hence
increases statistical significance, taEWS, and mean-variance trade-off, IREWS. At the same
time, only when there is potential outperformance, i.e., f> 0, would such risk reduction be
potentially valuable to investors. The two effects are separate, and apply generally to any
1/N indexing of active funds.19
In sum, risk reduction and potential outperformance — despite the latter being insignif-
icant and small at the fund level — can explain why passive portfolios of active funds can
generate reliably positive net alpha. Hence we need to both evaluate the effectiveness of
diversification and understand why alphas of the underlying active sector funds are indi-
vidually insignificant but, on average, positive. We address risk reduction and potential
outperformance in Sections 2.5 and 2.6.
2.5 Risk Reduction
A naive explanation for EWS’s alpha is that most funds generate statistically significant
alphas and EWS simply repackages them. However, we find limited evidence for this
argument.
[Insert Figure 2·2]
Figure 2·2 shows the count of funds in three different categories: the ones with insignif-
icant alpha, the ones with significant positive alpha, and the ones with significant negative
alpha. We calculate alphas using the four factor models we have used so far: CAPM,
Fama-French five-factor model, Carhart four-factor model, and CPZ model. A clear pat-
tern should be spot from the figure. Regardless of the model used, the majority of our
40 funds have insignificant alpha — only a handful of them generate significant positive
alpha, a few of them even generate significant negative alpha. We can hardly argue these
19Notice that there may be an optimal number, N⇤, that trades off the two effects. Initially, more funds
reduce risk (Effect 1) but eventually there are little or no funds with potential outperformance (Effect 2), i.e.,
df¯/dN < 0. In short, over-diversification could hurt performance.
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funds carry reliable alpha. In contrast, we argue below that diversification is the key to
understanding the remarkable result of generating significant alpha for a portfolio when the
underlying assets have insignificant alpha.
Diversification follows from holding a sufficient number of stocks, and that number is
around thirty to fifty. This accepted practical wisdom has its roots in academic papers from
1970s. Two widely cited papers on this subject are (Fisher and Lorie, 1970) and (Elton
and Gruber, 1977), drawing similar conclusions from empirical and theoretical arguments
respectively. Although correlation drives diversification, number of stocks also measures
diversification (Van Horne et al., 1975; Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008).
Most mutual funds hold more than fifty stocks, so investors may think their investments
are diversified. Such conclusion, although is by and large true, is subject to one problem.
That is, the alpha generated by the mutual fund, is orthogonal to its systematic risk, and
hence active risk remains an idiosyncratic risk that is not diversified. Admittedly, the alpha
is what draws the attention of investors who are willing to deviate from a passive index
fund. But one should also admit how inconsistent the alpha from an average fund is.
[Insert Figure 2·3]
Figure 2·3 plots the underlying funds’ monthly alphas against their standard deviations,
split by the factor model. The straight lines are the fitted lines from a regression of using
alpha as single regressor and alpha’s standard deviation as regressand. The feature we see
here is that funds with higher alphas generally also have more volatile alphas — this is a
visualization of conundrum of identifying funds with alpha ex ante. It is therefore subop-
timal to either predict which fund will generate alpha, or put concentrated weights in only
a few active funds. By placing active funds in an 1/N portfolio, we effectively trim the risk
associated with investing in individual alpha.
Additionally, the diversification of active funds also allow EWS to have a systematic
risk exposure similar to that of an index tracking fund. Looking at the factor exposure for
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EWS in Table 2.5 makes it hard to see how dispersed the factor exposures of the underlying
funds are. Because each active sector fund invests in one particular sector/industry, their
factor exposures vary a lot.
[Insert Table 2.6]
Table 2.6 provides additional evidence for the role of diversification. Using empirical
percentiles, it reports the cross-sectional distribution of the Carhart beta estimates for the
underlying sector funds. One should notice the large variations of betas. Due to different
target sectors, funds load on different factors. These discrepancies are net out to roughly
zero when we index them with equal weights, as shown in Table 2.5. Diversification helps
EWS to load of market factor. Notice that means of estimated betas in Table 2.6 are al-
most indistinguishable from estimated betas in Table 2.5 for the strategy. This is only true
when the factor model is correctly specified and hence additional evidence that managers
are using factor models to manage risks.20
We consider next mean-variance plots similar to (Markowitz, 1952). Because our fo-
cus is EWS outperformance, we study benchmark-adjusted returns, as opposed to gross
returns. Figure 2·4 plots the average benchmark-adjusted return vs. benchmark-adjusted
return standard deviation for the active funds and EWS. Each triangle represents a sector
fund. Solid triangles represent those funds with a statistical significant benchmark-adjusted
return and the circle represents the EWS strategy.
[Insert Figure 2·4]
Most funds do not earn significant benchmark-adjusted returns, but many have in-
sample positive average benchmark-adjusted returns. The statistical insignificance is a
20One might be tempted to wonder which funds are, for example, behind the 99th percentile of the co-
efficient distributions in Table 2.5. Semiconductors (FSELX) have had the highest market exposure, which
indicates operating rather than financial leverage is important. However, semiconductors did not perform
significantly better than the S&P 500. Similar observations apply to biotechnology, banking, and biotech-
nology again, which are, respectively, the 99th percentile for size factor (SMB), value factor (HML), and the
momentum factor (UMD).
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result of large standard deviations, a reflection of our previous discussion: the outper-
formance of mutual funds are hard to capture. Although some funds do earn a higher
benchmark-adjusted returns compared to simply indexing all of them, it is a formidable
task to predict which of them will be best in advance.
Diversification makes investors better off. Holding a pool of active funds with outper-
formance potential, investor could attain a better risk-return trade-off. Given the context
of Figure 2·4, the slope of the line that connects the origin and an portfolio is the informa-
tion ratio for that particular portfolio. (See (Goodwin, 1998)). Our EWS strategy attains
the highest slope — this is not driven by a higher average excess return, but by a smaller
volatility of excess returns, a result of diversification. For ease of comparison, the dotted
line indicates the ex-post best risk-return trade-off an investor could get if she invests in
one mutual fund only. The role of risk reduction is evident from the graph.
Risk reduction is only part of EWS. Diversification helps lowering volatility of alpha/benchmark-
adjusted returns, but explaining EWS also requires, on average, fund returns to outperform
the market. The next section discusses various hypotheses for the second part of EWS, i.e.,
why do these sector funds on average generate higher return than the market.
2.6 Potential Outperformance
2.6.1 Insufficient Fund Flows
We argue the magnitude of alpha of EWS strategy is a reflection of inefficiency of fund
inflow in relation to fund’s skill. In line with (Berk and Green, 2004) (2004, henceforth
B&G), other recent empirical studies document decreasing returns to scale in active fund
management industry (see, e.g., (Pástor et al., 2015) or (Chen et al., 2004) on size erosion
of fund performance). In short, when the fund inflow is insufficient to increase the fund
size to its equilibrium point — at which the net alpha is zero — the fund will have positive
alpha.
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B&G argue a fund’s alpha is uninformative about skill. This is in contrast to early stud-
ies that use alpha as indicator of a fund’s skill, for example (Jensen, 1968) and (Carhart,
1997). Given that fund’s skill (i.e., the ability to identify positive net present value op-
portunities) is scarce in supply, rational investors will put money in those mangers who
are capable. This creates fund inflow to managers who are able to generate alpha. Through
fund inflow, skilled managers collect rents for providing investment services, investors take
away alpha after fee, or net alpha. Eventually the fund grows in size and managers are no
longer able to find enough outperformance potential, so fund ends up with generating zero
net alpha in equilibrium.
Because mutual funds cannot adjust share prices to ensure the return going forward is
competitive, the adjustment comes through fund flows, hence size of fund is closely related
to its ability to generate alpha. (Pástor et al., 2017b), for example, have shown that a fund’s
net alpha is positive if and only if its size is smaller than its equilibrium size, and vice
versa. Empirically, (Chen et al., 2004) show fund size erodes fund performance. Trading
costs associated with liquidity or market impact force bigger funds to invest in stocks that
are more liquid and have larger market capitalizations. Thus, bigger funds may have to
invest in suboptimal stocks or take larger positions than what is optimal.
If the equilibrium argument goes through, then one should not use alpha as measure
of skills of active managers. Consistent with this predication, (Berk and van Binsbergen,
2015) finds that managers on average are skilled and the difference in skill is predominantly
reflected in difference of fund size, not gross alpha. Additionally, they show that a value-
weighted portfolio that invests in a sample of 5,974 funds (this sample is larger than most
comparable studies) returns negative 95 basis points per month after fees. In other words,
despite apparent skill, the economic rents are entirely collected by the fund mangers, not
investors.
Although the former argument is by and large true, and has been validated by several
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empirical studies, one should also agree that the equilibrium is an ideal state. A couple of
mechanisms could distort fund flows and, in turn, imply that fund size can be above and
below its equilibrium quantity.
The first distortion comes from slow learning (Pástor and Stambaugh, 2012). Endo-
geneity and persistence in fund size impede learning about decreasing returns to scale of
active funds and, as a result, cause investor’s adjustment to fund allocation (i.e., size) to be
slow too. Investors only moderately decrease their allocation to active management when
underperformance continues.
The second distortion comes from marketing efforts. (Barber et al., 2005) show that
investors are more likely to buy funds with higher marketing expenses. On average, money
spent on marketing more than offsets any negative effect of expense fees on fund flows.
Recent study such as (Roussanov et al., 2017) also stresses the importance of marketing
in determining fund flows. They find marketing is nearly as important as performance and
fees for determining fund size. Using portfolio of funds sorted by net skill, they find there
are both over-allocation to funds with low net skill and under-allocation to funds with high
net skill. They conclude that asset misallocation exists in both bad funds and good funds
in the data.
Overall, investors make mistakes due to imperfect information and costly search. When
the size of a given fund is smaller than its equilibrium size due to insufficient fund inflow,
there will be positive net alpha available to investors, which economically explains our
results.
There are several reasons why these fund flows are under-adjusted. First, sector funds
are often portrayed as bearing more risk due to their lack of cross-sector diversification.
Investors are hence less willing to put money into a fund with such narrow focus. Should
they considered the possibility of holding a diversified portfolio of sector funds, this could
change. Second, sector funds are nonstandard investment outlets and require more knowl-
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edge and studying, investors are simply attracted by funds with more salient and easy-
to-interpret information.21 Third, absence of readily available sector benchmarks make
it difficult for investors to evaluate the performance of sector funds, and make the fund
flow adjustment slow. Fourth, it’s nearly impossible to compare a given sector fund with
its competitors, including passive sector investment vehicles. Because fund managers are
usually unwilling to restrict themselves to a particular sector, active sector funds are rare,
and they usually have different definition for their targeting sector. As for sector ETFs, for
example, they also define sectors differently and track different sector benchmarks. It is
rarely useful to compare one sector fund to one of its competitors (if there is one).22
We apply procedure from (Roussanov et al., 2017) to show that most active sector funds
are smaller than their B&G implied equilibrium size. B&G provide a Bayesian updating
scheme for investors’ belief over a given fund manager’s skill. Once investor observes new
realized net alpha from the fund, she updates her belief about the fund’s skill. In the zero
net alpha equilibrium, investor’s belief about a fund’s skill must exactly offsets the expense
she pays plus fund’s unit operating cost for active management. Because a fund’s unit
operating cost is closely related to its size, this allows us to back out the equilibrium size
of fund.23
21Due to behavioral reasons, investors are more sensitive to obvious and salient information. (Barber et al.,
2005) find that investors have grown less willing to invest in funds with higher front-end-load fees, but kept
irresponsive to the difference of total operating expense ratios.
22 Two more practical factor that contribute to the positive net alpha are related to expenses. First, being
in the same fund family, the fund managers for these sector funds are constrained to set optimal fees. In
some cases, probably too low. Second, competition with low-cost passive funds/ETFs has driven down active
management fees.
23Mathematically, investors update their belief about a fund’s skill by the following equation: ft = ft 1+
wrt/(g+tw), where ft is investors’ posterior belief about a fund’s skill at time t, w is the precision (reciprocal
of variance) of excess return earned on the first dollar actively managed by the fund, g is the precision of
investor’s prior over fund’s skill, and rt is fund’s realized net alpha at time t. Once the prior belief over fund’s
belief f0 is provided, one can get ft recursively. Here we let investors update their beliefs each year. In the
competitive equilibrium, investor’s posterior belief over fund’s skill, i.e., expected revenue from investing,
equals the sum of fund’s unit operating cost plus expense: ft = c(qt)+ ft , where c(qt) is the unit cost of
actively managing a fund of size qt , and ft is its expense ratio at time t. c(qt) increases monotonically
to capture decreasing returns to scale in active fund management. Following (Roussanov et al., 2017), we
assume c(qt) = h log(qt), where h is a decreasing returns to scale parameter. So the B&G implied log fund
size is given by: log(qt) = (ft  ft)/h. We use the calibrated parameter values from (Roussanov et al., 2017)
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Annual realized net alpha is based on the Carhart model. (Other factor models give sim-
ilar results.) We first calculate monthly implied excess return over one-month T-bill rate of
a fund by multiplying its Carhart betas with contemporaneous Carhart factor returns. We
subtract the implied excess return from the actual excess return of a fund to get its monthly
realized gross alpha. We then aggregate monthly realized gross alpha to annual realized
gross alpha, and subtract fund’s expense ratio to get its annual realized net alpha. Finally,
we use the aforementioned procedure to get the B&G implied fund size at the end of our
sample period.
Figure 2·5 depicts B&G implied log fund size vs. actual log fund size. We sort active
sector funds into four groups on their net skills (investor’s posterior belief about their skills
net of expenses) from bottom to top. The line segments connect the mean log fund size of
each group, where the upper and lower bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. To see how
individual funds fits into the graph, we plot them with circles.
Across the net skill groups, one should notice the B&G implied mean log fund size is
larger than actual mean log fund size in the data, except for the bottom-performing group.
This reflects insufficient fund inflows for many of the active funds — 28 out of 40 funds
have smaller sizes than those implied by equilibrium. In fact, we see limited variation in
actual fund sizes for these sector funds with respect to skills. Surprisingly, the mean log
size for the best-performing group is smallest. This misallocation of capital by investors
hinders reward and punishment for past performance. Hence B&G’s equilibrium argument
fails for this particular group of active funds. In sum and consistent with (Roussanov et al.,
2017), and (Goldstein et al., 2017), the figure supports the view that active sector funds are
under-adjusted.
for f0, w, g, and h.
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2.6.2 Other Hypotheses
Short-Term Reversal
The contrarian nature of the equal-weighted strategy enables it to benefit from short-term
reversal like the lead-lag effect documented in (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990). Because our
strategy rebalances sector funds with equal weights, it is designed to sell sector/industry
portfolios that have outperformed in the past (winners) and buy those that have underper-
formed in the past (losers), hence it is essentially a contrarian strategy. But this will not
explain EWS’s outperformance.
By the same logic, EWS could be hurt by the mid-term momentum documented in
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) and benefit again from long-term reversal documented in
(Bondt and Thaler, 1985). So the EWS return would vary noticeably with the rebalanc-
ing frequency used. However, Table 2.3 shows the contrary, the performance of EWS is
insensitive to the rebalancing frequency.
Additionally, such momentum-reversal argument requires a sufficient valuation gap be-
tween winners and losers. It will be useful, therefore, to consider how quickly does the rel-
ative valuation of different sectors/industries change over time. Unreported results (avail-
able on request) analyze the sector weights in a buy and hold strategy, so sector weights are
driven over time by performance. No sector turns out to be dominating and it takes suffi-
cient long period of time for the few winners and losers to reverse their roles. Therefore,
neither frequent rebalancing is a key driver for the outperformance of EWS strategy, nor
are short-term reversals an explanation for our findings.
Embedded Leverage
Although most mutual funds face leverage constraints, funds might be able to enhance their
returns by investing in high market beta stocks, or stocks with embedded leverage. This
additional risk should be adjusted by the factor models we used and will not explain EWS’s
80
alpha. To clearly reject the hypothesis that embedded leverage is driving our strategy’s out-
performance, we sort funds into high-beta funds and low-beta funds based on their ex-ante
betas, and form an equal-weighted portfolio for high-beta funds and low-beta funds sepa-
rately. The ex-ante beta is estimated with CAPM using trailing 60-month data. We redo
the sorting each month to get monthly returns for the two beta-sorted portfolios. We then
use CAPM, Fama-French five-factor model, Carhart four-factor model and CPZ model to
estimate alpha for the beta-sorted portfolios. The result is reported in Figure 2·6. Regard-
less of the factor model used, the graph shows that high-beta funds earn a negative alpha
while low-beta funds earn positive alpha.24 This is consistent with the results of (Frazzini
and Pedersen, 2014), in which authors argue investors with no easy access to leverage bid
up high beta assets, resulting high beta assets to have lower alpha. Similarly, we conjecture
investors are more easily attracted by high-beta funds, because they tend to generate higher
past returns, and fund inflows soon take up fund manager’s best ideas, leading to a dimmed
prospect for alpha. From an alpha-enhancing perspective, investing in funds with higher
embedded leverage will only hinder us; see also (Christoffersen and Simutin, 2017).
[Insert Figure 2·6]
Active Share and/or Value-Size Tilt
Two related strategies involve large percentages of stocks that are not part of the S&P 500
index, and overweighting value and small-size stocks because sector funds tend to have
smaller sizes.
Inspection of the first hypothesis requires retrieval of historical fund holdings and com-
pare them with the index composition, as done by (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009). However,
active share is not a measure of skill but rather measures how different the fund’s holdings
are relative to the holdings of the particular benchmark considered. Hence it’s hardly a
24Since mutual funds are required to report their holdings and performance regularly, return-smoothing
should not distort the market beta estimates.
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predictor of benchmark-adjusted performance for a small sample of funds.
Another issue with active share is the determination of the passive benchmark. Using
fund’s self-declared benchmark is problematic in that funds are not bound to invest in their
self-declared style. Active share could be misleading and sensitive to the choice of passive
benchmarks used. To make things worse, the active sector funds in our sample failed to
clearly state their benchmarks.
On the other hand, because active share is defined as the sum of absolute deviations of
the fund’s stock holdings (weights) from those of its benchmark index portfolio, it is re-
ally a measure of fund’s selectivity, i.e. a measure of deviations from passive benchmarks.
(Amihud and Goyenko, 2013) proposed to use R2, obtained from a regression of fund’s re-
turns on a multifactor benchmark model, as an easy-to-compute substitute for active share
of (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009). A lower R2 implies a greater selectivity and predicts
higher return. They used Fama-French three-factor model, Carhart four-factor model and
CPZ model to calculate R2, similar to what we do. Inspecting Table 2.5, the high R2’s
across all factor models imply that fund selectivity is unlikely to be a sufficient explanation
for the outperformance of EWS.
Similarly, Table 2.5 rejects the tilt hypothesis. We see little tilt towards value or size
factors in the FFC models. With a moderate size tilt in the CPZ model, the CPZ model’s
alpha is still sizable and statistically significant. Thus, the value-size tilt does not explain
the outperformance either.
2.7 Conclusions
In this article, we have established that a passive and simple strategy can outperform the
market — buy sector funds with equal weights and rebalance periodically to preserve the
equal weighting. This strategy earns 5.70% of benchmark-adjusted return per year relative
to the S&P 500 from 1998 to 2016. The result is robust to fee, transaction cost, and tail risk.
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The outperformance is not driven by alternative weighting or alternative beta exposure —
the strategy has a market beta close to one and only a mild exposure to the size factor.
We are the first to consider passive indexation of active funds as an alternative for in-
vestors to allocate capital to external active managers. Creating a passive indexation of
active funds means to mimic a passive investor and trade active funds following simple
rules, e.g., to periodically rebalance active funds to equal weights. Passive indexation sug-
gests institutional investor to focus on the diversification of active risk and the correspond-
ing increase in top-level information ratio and spend less operation costs on researching
skilled managers. As we discussed in the paper, predicting the next high-alpha fund is
cost-ineffective.
Although we have focused on one particular strategy in this paper, namely Equal-
Weighted Sector (EWS) strategy, the idea of passive indexation of active funds can be
applied to, e.g., style investing too. Specifically, a passive indexation of active value funds
is likely to outperform a value benchmark, if alphas of underlying funds are not highly
correlated. But if active managers select similar securities, their active risks are no longer
fund-specific or diversifiable, which hinders increases in top-level information ratio. Alter-
native schemes may prove useful. For example, if smaller funds are more likely to generate
alpha, one could over-weight smaller funds in the passive indexation strategy. Similarly,
younger funds are on average more likely to outperform so fund age could be another di-
mension to consider.
Moreover, passive indexation of active funds can accommodate an investor’s ‘view’ on
which funds are more likely to outperform. For example, a momentum strategy with sector
funds has proven to be profitable (O’Neal, 2000). The takeaway from our research is in-
stitutional investor should consider whether the increase in expected alpha will be able to
compensate the increase in active risk due to more activeness.
One practical aspect for future work is over-diversification. (McKay et al., 2018) ar-
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gue that too much diversification leads to too little active risk and a diminished chance to
outperform after management fees. This is not an issue for the EWS strategy. In practice,
whether there is over-diversification is always a subtle problem. Instead of blindly invest-
ing in too many funds, institutional investor should evaluate whether there is an after-cost
positive marginal benefit from diversification. The alpha arithmetic of this article could
guide this line of research too.
84
Table 2.1
Annual Return (%) of EWS
The table reports the annual net returns of Equal Weighted Sector strategy
and S&P 500 index, and the expense ratio for EWS. EWS stands for Equal
Weighted Sector. EWS here rebalances each month, we consider different
benchmarks and different rebalancing frequencies in table 2.3. The data
coverage is from September 1st 1998 to June 30th 2016. The annual return
for 1998 is the cumulative return from September 1st to December 31st
1998; the annual return for 2016 is the cumulative return from January 1st
2001 to June 30th 2016. Expense ratios are adjusted proportionately to
time span.
EWS S&P 500 ExcessReturn
Expense
Ratio
1998 30.24 28.41 1.83 1.61
1999 25.50 19.53 5.97 1.48
2000 9.96  10.14 20.10 1.43
2001  6.01  13.04 7.03 1.36
2002  17.82  23.37 5.55 1.31
2003 35.97 26.38 9.59 1.44
2004 16.42 8.99 7.43 1.32
2005 13.78 3.00 10.78 1.08
2006 14.37 13.62 0.75 1.03
2007 10.77 3.53 7.24 0.98
2008  40.21  38.49  1.73 0.93
2009 44.03 23.45 20.58 0.94
2010 22.55 12.78 9.76 0.96
2011  3.04 0.00  3.04 0.90
2012 17.19 13.41 3.78 0.87
2013 33.28 29.60 3.68 0.86
2014 9.79 11.39  1.60 0.82
2015  2.76  0.73  2.03 0.81
2016 4.26 2.69 1.57 0.81
t statistic 2.51 3.69
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Table 2.2
Measuring Fidelity Bias: September 1998 to June 2016
Numbers correspond to the equal-weighted portfolio of all the funds in that
class. Annual returns are calculated by timing 12 to the average monthly
returns. Fidelity only corresponds to our sample.
Annual
Return
Annual
Carhart Alpha
All categories
Fidelity only 9.69% 0.93%
Fidelity + others 8.38  0.32
Sector funds
Fidelity only 11.25% 2.64%
Fidelity + others 10.22 2.11
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Table 2.3
Different Rebalancing Frequency for EWS Strategy
The table reports the return profile of Equal Weighted Sector (EWS) strat-
egy. Three different rebalancing frequencies are considered. Buy and hold
column reports the results for no rebalancing. SSE (SPDR Sector ETF)
is an equal-weighted portfolio of indexed investments in ten S&P sectors.
Average return for monthly and quarterly rebalancing are annualized. The
corresponding t statistics are reported in parenthesis. Turnover is the total
value of trades as proportion of the portfolio value. EWS and S&P 500 data
are from September 1998 to June 2016, SSE data are from January 1999 to
June 2016.
Rebalancing Frequency Buy and
Hold
Monthly Quarterly Yearly
Panel A: Cumulative Return
EWS 5.6459 5.6957 5.7888 5.2778
EWS   S&P 500 3.4533 3.5032 3.5963 3.0852
SSE   S&P 500 1.5296 1.5070 1.5205 1.3485
EWS   SSE 1.0979 1.1471 1.2189 1.0612
Panel B: Average Annual Return
EWS 0.1170 0.1194 0.1668 0.1612
(2.8479) (2.6629) (2.2786) (2.1856)
EWS   S&P 500 0.0570 0.0575 0.0621 0.0565
(4.7360) (5.2149) (4.1097) (3.6812)
SSE   S&P 500 0.0368 0.0360 0.0376 0.0346
(4.2333) (4.1613) (4.7054) (4.0947)
EWS   SSE 0.0198 0.0216 0.0241 0.0204
(1.6751) (1.9486) (1.6814) (1.3564)
Panel C: Average Annual Turnover
EWS 37.62% 22.63% 11.55% –
SSE 30.63% 17.80% 11.75% –
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Table 2.4
Downside Risk Analysis
Panel A reports the drawdown statistics for two financially distressed peri-
ods in our sample. Panel B defines the bear market as months with negative
trailing two-year cumulative return of S&P 500 (Daniel and Moskowitz,
2016) and bull market otherwise. Panel C tests state contingency with the
following regression:
ReEWS,t = a+aBIB,t 1+(b+bBIB,t 1)ReSPX,t + et
where IB,t 1 is the bear market indicator, and aB and bB are bear alpha and
bear beta, respectively. The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. The
t-test for beta tests whether the estimate is one.
Panel A: Drawdown
Maximum
Drawdown
Drawdown
Duration (yr.)
Time to
Recovery (yr.)
Great Recession
EWS -55.97% 3.23 1.82
S&P 500 -56.78% 5.47 4.05
Dot-com Bubble
EWS -37.30% 3.35 1.24
S&P 500 -49.15% 7.19 4.64
Panel B: Contingent Average Monthly Return
Bull Market Bear Market
EWS 0.88% 0.42%
S&P 500 0.54% -0.21%
EWS - S&P 500 0.34% 0.64%
(3.03) (3.17)
Panel C: Bear Market Conditionality
Alpha(%) Bear Alpha(%) Beta Bear Beta R2ad j
1 0.42 1.06 0.92
( 4.26 ) (2.62)
2 0.33 0.31 1.04 0.04 0.92
(2.69) (1.46) (1.12) (0.84)
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Table 2.5
Factor Attribution of Returns of EWS Strategy
The table reports estimates of betas and alphas for the EWS strategy; t statistics are in
parentheses. We report two different t statistics. The top t statistic uses Newey-West
standard errors (Newey and West, 1994); the bottom one uses 10,000 bootstrapped samples
(Politis and Romano, 1994). Panel A shows the result using common linear asset pricing
factors. MKT, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA, UMD are market factor, size factor, value factor,
profitability factor, investment factor, and momentum factor, respectively. Fama-French
Five use factors from (Fama and French, 2015); Carhart comes from (Carhart, 1997). For
the MKT beta, t–test tests whether it is 1.0. Panel B uses common tradable benchmarks
as factors, CPZ is the IDX4 model from (Cremers et al., 2013). S5 - RF is return of S&P
500 index minus one-month T-Bill rate, R2-S5 is return of Russell 2000 minus S&P 500,
R3V-R3G is return of Russell 3000 Value minus Russell 3000 Growth. For the beta of
S5-RF, t test tests whether it is 1.0.
Panel A: Fama-French-Carhart Factors
Factors
Model Alpha(%) MKT SMB HML RMW CMA UMD R2ad j
CAPM 0.25 1.02 0.94
(2.39) (0.66)
(2.04) (0.51)
Fama-
French
Five
0.14 1.05 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.95
(1.37) (1.58) (3.54) (1.34) (2.51) (0.43)
(1.97) (1.88) (2.62) (0.89) (1.46) (0.35)
Carhart 0.22 1.01 0.10 0.12 -0.03 0.95
(2.05) (0.20) (2.75) (1.95) (-0.83)
(2.41) (0.32) (1.82) (1.12) (-1.02)
Panel B: Investable Benchmarks
Factors
Model Alpha(%) S5-RF R2-S5 R3V-R3G UMD R2ad j
S&P 500 0.37 1.04 0.92
(3.27) (1.28)
(3.06) (1.09)
CPZ 0.27 1.02 0.30 0.06 -0.01 0.95
(2.49) (0.58) (10.39) (1.00) (-0.23)
(3.39) (1.14) (8.99) (0.53) (-0.26)
89
Table 2.6
Carhart Factor Exposures of Active Sector Funds
The table summarizes the cross-section of estimated betas for the 40 active
sector funds in our sample, using Carhart four-factor model. All estimations
use monthly data from September 1998 to June 2016.
MKT SMB HML UMD
Mean 1.01 0.10 0.11  0.02
Standar Deviation 0.24 0.23 0.53 0.10
1st Percentile 0.53  0.31  1.00  0.27
5th Percentile 0.61  0.25  0.88  0.16
10th Percentile 0.70  0.19  0.81  0.11
50th Percentile 0.99 0.07 0.25  0.03
90th Percentile 1.31 0.42 0.68 0.09
95th Percentile 1.48 0.43 0.74 0.12
99th Percentile 1.48 0.61 0.86 0.19
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Figure 2·1. Growth of $1,000 Investment.
The plot displays the cumulative portfolio value from investing $1,000 in the
Equal Weighted Sector (EWS) strategy and S&P 500 index (SPX). The solid
line corresponds to EWS strategy, the dashed line corresponds to S&P 500
index. Panel A shows the portfolio values. Panel B shows corresponding
drawdowns. The investment period is from September 1st, 1998, to June
30, 2016.
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Figure 2·2. Alpha Significance
This figure plots the number of active sector funds in different categories of
alpha significance. Four factor models are used to account for risks: CAPM,
Fama-French five-factor model from (Fama and French, 2015), Carhart
four-factor model form (Carhart, 1997), and CPZ four-factor model from
(Cremers et al., 2013)
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Figure 2·3. Alpha vs. Standard Deviation
This figure plots funds’ monthly alphas against their standard deviations
split by the factor model used. Each circle corresponds to an active sector
fund. The fitted lines use alpha as single regressor for its standard deviation.
The factor models used are, CAPM, Fama-French five-factor model from
(Fama and French, 2015), Carhart four-factor model form (Carhart, 1997),
and CPZ four-factor model from (Cremers et al., 2013)
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Figure 2·4. Mean-Variance Trade-off
Each triangle represents an active sector fund, the solid triangles represent
those funds with a statistically significant benchmark-adjusted return. The
benchmark used is S&P 500 monthly return. The vertical axis gives the
average monthly benchmark-adjusted return, the horizontal axis gives the
associated standard deviation. The solid circle indicates the coordinates for
the Equal Weighted Sector (EWS) strategy. The dashed line corresponds to
the ex-post optimal risk-return trade-off if invested in an individual active
sector fund. The solid line corresponds to achieved risk-return trade-off for
EWS. The slopes of the lines are corresponding information ratios.
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Figure 2·5. Under-Adjustment for Active Sector Funds
This figure plots (Berk and Green, 2004) implied log fund size in equi-
librium versus actual log fund size. The underlying active sector funds
are sorted into four net skill groups, in which net skill is defined as
investors’ posterior expectation of fund’s skill minus fund’s expense. The
line connects the mean log fund size for net skill groups, the upper and
lower bars indicate the 95% confidence bounds of the mean. Each circle
represents an active sector fund. Net skill group 1 has the lowest skill while
net skill group 4 has the highest skill.
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Figure 2·6. Alphas of Beta-Sorted Funds
Alphas(%) of beta-sorted portfolios which are constructed from active sec-
tor funds with equal weights. The funds are sorted into low-beta funds
and high-beta funds according to their ex-ante market betas estimated us-
ing 60-month moving windows. The alphas are intercepts from regres-
sions of monthly returns accounted for factor exposures. Four factor models
are used, CAPM, Fama-French five-factor model from (Fama and French,
2015), Carhart four-factor model form (Carhart, 1997), and CPZ four-factor
model from (Cremers et al., 2013)
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Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Extended Model
A.1.1 Manager’s Problem
Next, I consider manager’s problem. Substituting Equation (1.1) into (1.2), multiplying
both sides by qit , and rearranging gives
qit(µit bqit) = qit pit (A.1)
where the right-hand side of the Equation represents the manager’s compensation, which is
what the manager seeks to optimize. She achieves this by choosing the optimal fund size qit
that maximizes the left hand side. The left hand side of the Equation is the amount of dol-
lars the manager can extract from the market with active management, or the value added
of the manager. Let q⇤it be the optimal fund size for the manager, it is easy to check that
q⇤it = µit/2b. Given this fund size, the manager then selects a fee, p⇤it , so that the equilibrium
condition (1.2) is satisfied:
p⇤it =
µit
2
. (A.2)
As µit changes over time, this fee setting scheme requires the manager to change fee in
every period. This dynamics of fund fee is counter-factual; time-variation in fund fee is
infrequent.
Instead, let the manager index — that is, passively invest — part of the capital. By
doing so, the manager can choose a wide range of fixed fee to implement exactly the same
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compensation. If the manager selects a fixed fee pi < p⇤it , investors will choose to invest
qit > q⇤it (by using Equation (1.2)). The manager actively invest q⇤it and passive invest the
extra capital qit   q⇤it ; investors pay fund fee pi on the total fund size qit . In this case, the
expected gross alpha of the manager becomes
Et [rgit+1(qt)] =
✓
q⇤it
qit
◆
Et [rgit+1(q
⇤
it)]+
✓
qit  q
⇤
it
qit
◆
0=
µ2it
4bqit
. (A.3)
It is easy to check that the manager implement exactly the same compensation either by
changing optimal fee in each period or by charging a fixed fee and indexing part of the
capital.1
A.1.2 Empirical Approximation
Notice that the net alpha rnit in equilibrium condition (1.2) is a function of fund size qit .
Therefore, we can use this equilibrium condition to calculate the equilibrium fund size qeit ,
i.e., the size of the fund such that expected net alpha equals to zero. In the rational and
competitive market, this is the amount of capital investors should allocate to an active fund.
In order to calculate the expected net alpha, we need information of fund fee pit , which
is observable, and an estimate of fund gross alpha agit , which ultimately requires estimates
of fund skill ait and returns to scale parameter of active management  b.
The fund production function (1.1) resembles a panel regression model. Indeed, in re-
cent literature, the common practice to estimate returns to scale of active management is
to run a fixed-effect panel regression of the form (See, e.g, (Pástor et al., 2015) and (Zhu,
2018)):
rit = ai+bqit 1+ eit .
This panel regression identifies a time-invariant fund skill ai and the returns to scale of ac-
1If the manager charges a time-varying fee p⇤it in period t, she receives a compensation of p⇤itq⇤it = µ2it/4b.
If she charges a fixed fee pi, this fee must equal to expected gross alpha (A.3) in equilibrium. Multiplying
the expected gross alpha (A.3) with fund size qit gives the same compensation.
98
tive management b, where eit is a return surprise. With these estimates, it is straightforward
to calculate the equilibrium fund size. But it is worth pointing out that this approach is at
odds with the theory in one aspect. From my discussion of the fund manager’s problem
above, it is clear that many funds are probably operating with a fund size qit larger than
optimal active capital amount q⇤it so that they do not have to adjust fees frequently. For this
reason, the linear fund production function (1.1) only holds true when fund size is less than
or equal to the optimal active fund size, i.e., qit  q⇤it . One can easily check that, when
qit > q⇤it , the gross alpha a
g
it = (ait  µit2 ) µit2bqit , which is a nonlinear function in fund size qit .
This is shown in figure A·1.
In figure A·1, the solid line shows the theoretical gross alpha as a function of fund size
qit . The manager invests all capital before she reaches fund size q⇤it and then starts to in-
dex the extra capital. The change of manager’s behavior introduces a nonlinearity in the
relationship of gross alpha to fund size, making it very hard, if not impossible, to exactly
estimate parameters ait and b. More importantly, q⇤it is not observable to the econometri-
cian, and any reasonable attempts to address the nonlinearity will be severely biased with
this lack of knowledge.
Using a linear approximation for the theoretical alpha seems an acceptable simplifi-
cation at reasonable price. The dashed line in figure A·1 shows this choice, where the
fund performance always decreases linearly with total fund size qt . This choice assumes
agit = ait  b˜qit holds true for total fund size qit with a different returns to scale paramter b˜.
This allows researchers to run panel regressions for estimation of fund production function.
The downside of this linear approximation is that it introduces a bias in the estimate
of b. As is evident in figure A·1, the dashed line (empirical approximation) is flatter than
the solid line (theoretical relation) when fund size has not reached q⇤it . The value of b is
biased downwards to zero (in other words, b˜ < b), favoring a constant returns to scale in
active management. Indeed, existing studies using this linear approximation seem to give
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estimates that are too low.2
2For example, in (Pástor et al., 2015), a $100 million increase in fund size depresses performance by
0.0022% per month, or only 2.5 bps per year.
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Figure A·1. Fund Size and Gross alpha.
This figure shows the theoretical relationship (solid line) vs. empirical relationship (dotted
line) of alpha with respect to fund size. The theoretical relationship is nonlinear: gross
alpha agit = ait   bqit when 0 < qit <= q⇤it ; when qit > q⇤it , the gross alpha agit = (ait  µit
2 )
µit
2bqit
. Empirically, I approximate this nonlinear relationship with a linear relationship:
agit = ait   b˜qit , where b˜ < b. The equilibrium fund size q˜t is the point at which expected
net alpha equals zero.
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A.2 Bias Correction and Details of Estimation
This section discusses the estimation of fund production function parameters. I start with
a brief review of the recent developments in estimation strategy for returns to scale in
active mutual fund market, with an emphasis on the inherent econometric biases and their
remedies. I then explain details of my estimation procedures.
A.2.1 Previous Literature on Bias Correction
For recent literature on estimation of returns to scale in active management, readers can skip
subsection A.2.1. The recursive-demeaning techniques is discussed in subsection A.2.1.
OLS and Omitted-Variable Bias
Let’s focus on omitted-variable bias first. If fund sizes are randomly assigned to funds in
the cross-section, we can run an ordinary least square regression
rit = a+bqit 1+µit (A.1)
and pooled OLS regression will correctly identifies the decreasing returns to scale paramter
b. This regression suffers from an omitted-variable bias due to the fact that fund specific
termwit is not observable to econometricians andwit is correlated with both rit and qit 1. To
understand the latter point, recall that fund skill ait = a+wit and the equilibrium adjustment
come through fund size in mutual funds. By definition, a skilled fund is more likely to
generate higher risk-adjusted performance rit and this attracts investor flows so that the
fund also tends to have a larger fund size. Applying the ommited-variable bias formula in
(Angrist and Pischke, 2008), these two positive correlations imply that regression (A.1) has
a positive bias in the estimate b. Moreover, OLS regression does not identify fund skills.
Fortunately, we can exploit panel data and correctly identify and remove the fund het-
erogeneity, if we are willing to assume the fund specific term wit is time time invariant. If
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we are willing to assume
wit = wi, (A.2)
then fund skill is also time invariant
ait = a+wi = ai, (A.3)
and we can use fixed-effects to solve the omitted-variable bias problem. The new regression
becomes
rit = ai+bqit 1+ eit (A.4)
where eit represents unobservable return surprises that is orthogonal to all right hand vari-
ables. Moreover, Equation (A.4) is motivated by the original model in (Berk and Green,
2004), which assumes differential but constant skills for mutual funds. Regression (A.4)
has the benefit of both removing ommited-variable bias and identifying fund differential
skills. (Pástor et al., 2015) studies regression (A.4) and they further include control vari-
ables including industry size (total AUM of domestic equity funds divided by total market
capitalization of domestic equities), fund age and so on. Their results show that over time
domestic mutual funds have become more skilled.
Time-Invariant Skill and Recursive Demeaning Technique
The literature so far has been concerned with estimating time-invariant fund skill. Consider
the following assumed fund production function:
rit = ai+bqit 1+ eit (A.5)
where rit is fund alpha, the fixed effect ai captures the time-invariant cross-sectional differ-
ences in funds’ abilities of identifying profitable investment opportunities, qit 1 is lagged
fund size, b (expected to be negative) measures the rate at which fund performance erodes
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with fund size, and eit is a return surprise orthogonal to right-hand variables. In this setup,
ai is the fund skill, corresponding to that of (Berk and Green, 2004) model. And model
(A.5) is very similar to the production function (1.1) in our theoretical model except that
skill level is time-invariant.
It is natural to estimate this model with a fixed effects estimator, except that there is a
finite-sample bias that needs correction. The bias arises from a contemporaneous correla-
tion between fund size qit and performance rit due to fund performance-flow relationship
— fund flow is positively correlated with fund performance, see, e.g., (Chevalier and Elli-
son, 1997). Because of this correlation, fixed effects estimator suffers from a positive bias
in b (Pástor et al., 2015).
The recursive-demeaning technique is proposed to correct this bias. (Pástor et al., 2015)
develop the first recursive-demeaning estimator but find their estimator have insufficient
power to establish fund-level decreasing returns to scale. (Zhu, 2018) proposes an enhanced
estimator to increase statistical power, and I will discuss her approach in the following.
Let the forward-demeaned regressor xit 1 be defined as
xit 1 = xit 1  1Ti  t+1
Ti
Â
s=t
xis 1, (A.6)
we can transform model (A.5) into a forward-demeaned model
rit = bqit 1+ eit , (A.7)
where the fixed effect ai drops out. Using lagged fund size qit 1 as an instrument of
forward-demeaned fund size qit 1, slope coefficient b can be consistently estimated with
two-stage least square (2SLS):
qit 1 = t+qit 1+ vit 1
rit = bbqit 1+ eit . (A.8)
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Lagged fund size qit 1 is a valid instrument for forward-demeaned fund size qit 1. First,
it is apparently correlated with qit 1 by definition (relevance). Second, because it contains
information from the past, it is uncorrelated with forward-demeaned return surprise eit ,
which only contains current and future information (exclusion).
A.2.2 Estimating Fund Skill and Returns to Scale of Active Management
We begin by substituting Equation (1.11) into fund production function (1.10) which results
in
rit = hi+ f (qit 1,nit 1)+ eit , (A.9)
where
f (qit 1,nit 1) = bqit 1+h(qit 1,nit 1). (A.10)
This partially linear model can be estimated to give consistent estimates of fund constant
skill hi as a fixed effect, where f (·) is modeled as a polynomial series expansion in fund size
and turnover. Since f (·) controls for the unobservable cyclical skill wit and hi controls for
the permanent fund heterogeneity, the error term in fund production function is no longer
correlated with fund size and we solve the omitted-variable bias problem. According to
(Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003), I use a third-order polynomial series expansion in qit 1 and
nit 1 for f (·):
f (qit 1,nit 1) = Â
m, j2N0
0<m+ j3
qmit 1n
j
it 1lmj
where there’s no constant in this polynomials by assumption, the constant is nested into
hi. Therefore estimation of first stage Equation (A.9) boils down to running a fixed-effects
estimation on a polynomial regression3. Since qit 1 is included in the right-hand side, we
run into the finite-sample bias discussed by (Pástor et al., 2015) and therefore I utilize (Zhu,
2018)’s recursive demeaning estimator for the first stage regression. I first construct all the
3To avoid multicollinearity in polynomial terms, I regress on the orthogonal basis of polynomials. The
same technique is used in all the polynomial regression in the following.
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forward-demeaned terms in Equation (A.9), dropping fixed effect hi, which leads to:
rit = f (qit 1,nit 1)+ eit , (A.11)
where
f (qit 1,nit 1) = Â
m, j2N0
0<m+ j3
qmit 1n
j
it 1 ·lmj.
That is, all the polynomial terms are forward-demeaned. I then instrument the polynomial
terms qmit 1n
j
it 1 with q
m
it 1n
j
it 1. For example, I instrument qit 1 with qit 1, q
2
it 1 with q2it 1,
qit 1n2it 1 with qit 1n
2
it 1 and so on. Intuitively, I instrument the endogenous polynomial
f (qit 1,nit 1) with polynomial f˜ (qit 1,nit 1).
Lagged fund size times forward-demeaned turnover qmit 1n
j
it 1 is valid instrument for
qmit 1n
j
it 1 because a) they are correlated by definition and b) q
m
it 1n
j
it 1 is orthogonal to
forward-demeaned return surprise eit because the former only contains information in the
past, qit 1, and exogenous variable, n jit 1.
We can invoke these instruments via a two stage least square estimation. This procedure
ensures that we have consistent estimates ofdlmj and we have estimated fixed effects as
bhi = 1Ti
Ti
Â
t=1
(rit  bf (qit 1,nit 1)) 8i (A.12)
Next we proceed to second stage estimation in order to separate bqit 1 from f (qit 1,nit 1)
and identify parameter b — the decreasing returns to scale parameter. Substituting Equa-
tion (1.11) into the definition of function f (·) gives
wit = f (qit 1,nit 1) bqit 1 = wit(b). (A.13)
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Also, notice that assumption 2 implies that we can write wit as a function of wit 1:
wit+1 = E[wit+1|It 1]+xit+1
= E[wit+1|wit ]+xit+1
= g(wit)+xit+1
(A.14)
where xit represents an innovation that is orthogonal to information set It 1. Given a hypo-
thetical guess of b we then construct
\wit(b) = bf (qit 1,nit 1) bqit 1
where bf (qit 1,nit 1) is the predicted value from first stage estimation. Using Equation
(A.14), we then regress \wit+1(b) on\wit(b), where similarly I approximate function g(wit)
with a third-order polynomial in wit . The residuals of this regression are the implied values
of \xit+1(b).
We search in space of candidate b that minimizes the sum of squared \xit+1(b). That is,
we search for b that minimizes the objective
min
b
min
g Ât,i
⇣
\wit+1(b) g(\wit(b))
⌘2
(A.15)
this is equivalent to a non-linear least square regression. Alternatively, one can think of
this as a GMM estimation using identity matrix as weighting matrix and invoke moment
conditions
E
264\xit+1(b)⌦
0B@ 1bf (qit 1,nit 1)
1CA
375= 0 (A.16)
In both cases, we have asymptotic normality. Once bb is determined, we also determine the
cyclical skill \wit+1(b) and hence the time t+1 skill of fund i is calculated as
dait+1 = bhi+ dwi+1. (A.17)
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In order to get an estimate of standard errors of bˆ, I use clustered-bootstrap technique,
treating each fund as a cluster. This completes the estimation procedure.
A.3 Data Preparation Details
I use CRSP survivorship-bias-free US mutual fund database. The data ranges from January
1977 to December 2017 and contains 4,186 active domestic equity funds. The start of the
sample coincides with the introduction of the first open-ended index fund.
I use CRSP style code to eliminate bond funds, money market funds, international
funds, fund of funds, industry funds, real estate funds, target retirement funds, balanced
funds, and alternative funds4. To complement style code, I also exclude funds that hold,
on average, less than 50% of assets in stocks or more than 20% of assets in cash. I also
exclude index funds as identified by CRSP, as well as funds whose names contain keyword
“index", "S&P" etc. 5. I exclude fund-month observations with expense ratio less than
0.1% because they are unlikely to be active funds.
CRSP has limited data coverage for monthly AUM before 1991. From December 1961
to December 1969, the AUM only have annual data points; from January 1970 to December
1990, AUM has quarterly data points. For this reason, (Pástor et al., 2015) choose to drop
data before 1993. However, 1977 to 1993 corresponds to a period during which the mutual
fund industry rapidly grows. Given the goal of studying the evolution of fund skill in face
of change in the industry landscape, it is therefore necessary to keep this period of data.
Therefore I choose to fill the missing observations with the most recent observation in the
past.
Expense ratios are often missing in CRSP. However, I am able to fill many missing
expense ratios by extending the annually-reported expense ratio to the entire fiscal year.
4Specially, I exclude funds that use hedge fund investment strategies. These are funds that fall into the
following categories: specialty diversified equity funds (e.g., enhanced indexation funds and market short
funds), absolute return funds, equity leverage funds, dedicated short bias funds, and long/short equity funds.
5A complete list of keywords I use can be found in the data Appendix of (Berk and van Binsbergen, 2015).
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This leaves me with 16.5% of missing observations. Because we need expense ratio to
calculate fund’s gross return, they are crucial in the analysis of fund’s skill. I therefore
choose to drop all fund-month observations with missing expense ratios.
Many funds provide different share classes and they are regarded as separate funds in
CRSP. This is misleading because these share classes usually only differ in the fees charged
and refer to the same underlying assets. Treating them as separate funds is therefore in-
appropriate. I aggregate the share classes of the same fund. Different share classes of the
same fund can be easily identified by matching string patterns in CRSP fund name. Specif-
ically, CRSP provides a separator in the fund name in the form of either a colon(Ò:Ó) or a
slash(Ò/Ó). Different share classes have same information before the separator (fund main
name) and different information after (share class name). The single fund AUM is calcu-
lated by summing over all existing share classes. To aggregate fund return, turnover, and
expense ratio across share classes, I take AUM-weighted average of non-missing values.
I adjust all fund AUM numbers by inflation and express them in January 1, 2017 Dol-
lars. I exclude fund-month observations until a fund’s AUM reaches $15 million in January
1, 2017 Dollars. Once a fund enters the sample it remains in the sample even if its sub-
sequent AUM drops below 15 million Dollars. A 15 million-dollar threshold is suggested
by (Elton et al., 2001) to avoid the problem of omission bias in CRSP. On the other hand,
keeping a fund in the sample regardless of the possible subsequent decrease in its fund size
helps to alleviate the concern of incubation bias of (Evans, 2010).
A key variable used in my identification strategy is fund turnover ratio. Unfortunately,
it is only available at each fiscal year end of the given fund and we have to fill missing
monthly observations. Similar to (Pástor et al., 2017a), I use lagged turnover ratio, and I
fill it with fund’s turnover ratio for the most recent fiscal year that ends before month t.
This measure is defined as
Turnoveri,t 1 =
min(buysi,t 1,sellsi,t 1)
avg(TNAi,t 1)
(A.18)
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where the numerator is the lesser of amounts of purchases or sales of securities by the
fund for the fiscal year before month t, and the denominator is the monthly average of
the fund’s total net assets during the same fiscal year. This is the definition of turnover
that fund is required to calculate and report to the SEC, it is also the fund turnover ratio
in CRSP. I winsorize fund turnover ratio at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In my empirical
analysis, I also standardize each fund’s turnover ratio by deducting its time-series average
and divide it by the time-series standard deviation. This standardization is used to eliminate
the cross-sectional variation in turnover due to the nature of fund’s investment strategies (a
momentum fund, for example, will have a higher turnover than a value fund) and keep
within variation in how much a fund trades.
In order to measure fund skill, we need to compare its performance with the next best
investable opportunity, or benchmark. Instead of identifying the benchmark directly, the
common practice in the mutual fund literature is to adjust fund return with a linear factor
asset pricing model. By doing so, researchers assume that the factors in the factor models
are readily available for investors to invest.
This assumption is questionable. First, many of the factors are the returns of a long-
short portfolio that is hard to implement in practice. Second, this practice further assumes
absence of transaction cost. Even if some factors are investable through factor targeting
investment vehicles, investors still need to pay expenses to get exposure to these factors.
Finally, most of the factors are discovered by researchers after 1990 and took years to be
adopted by the public, they are therefore not in the information set of investors in the early
half of my data span. Adjusting risk with these factors before they are published creates a
hindsight bias. 6 7
6There is also research related to the unintended consequence of using factor models to asses fund’s
performance. (Cremers et al., 2013) show that if one uses Fama-French-Carhart factors of (Fama and French,
1996) and (Carhart, 1997) to adjust risks, then even passive benchmark indices like S&P 500 index and
Russell 2000 will have significant alphas. These concerns lead to deviate from this practice.
7Another possible choice of benchmark is the Morningstar designated benchmark portfolio. This bench-
mark choice is adopted by (Pástor et al., 2015) and (Zhu, 2018). This approach effectively assumes a bench-
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My choice of benchmark is the set of Vanguard index funds suggested by (Berk and
van Binsbergen, 2015). I differ from them in one aspect, I drop three international funds in
their list because my sample is comprised of domestic funds only. Table 1.1 lists the eight
benchmark funds in my sample. Then the benchmark for a fund is defined as the closet
portfolio in this set of portfolio. The benchmark return for fund i at time t is given by
RBit =
n(t)
Â
j=1
b ji R
j
t (A.19)
where Rjt is the excess return of jth Vanguard fund at time t, n(t) is the number of Van-
guard index funds available at time t and b ji is obtained from appropriate linear projection
of the ith fund excess return on the set of Vanguard index funds. Because these funds are
introduced at different times, we first sort them in chronological order by their inception
date. Then we iteratively construct an orthogonal basis of these funds by projecting the nth
fund on the orthogonal basis produced by the first n  1 funds over the periods when the
nth fund exists. The mean plus residual of this projection then become the orthogonal basis
of nth fund. In time periods before the inception date of nth fund, we insert zeros. Then
we calculate an augmented orthogonal basis by replacing the zeros when the fund does not
exist with the mean return of the basis fund when it does exist. Fund alpha can be consis-
tently estimated by computing the betas b ji in Equation (A.19) with augmented orthogonal
basis and then calculating benchmark return using Equation (A.19) with orthogonal basis
where the missing returns are replaced with zeros.8
Because the first Vanguard fund is introduced in late 1976, I choose to start the sample
in the year of 1977. So the final data spans from 1977 to 2017. Finally, I drop funds with
less than 24 months of data in key variables (monthly return, expense ratio, lagged fund
mark beta of one for all funds and Morningstar correctly classifies funds by their nature. It also ignores
transaction cost but has the advantage of circumventing estimation errors. Due to data limitation, I do not
report results related to this benchmark choice.
8Appendix of (Berk and van Binsbergen, 2015) gives detailed description of the estimation steps.
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size, and lagged turnover ratio).
Table 1.2 lists the descriptive statistics of the key variables in the sample.
A.4 Robustness Checks
Table A.1
Decreasing Returns to Scale in Full Sample and Post 1991 Sample
This table estimates the regression rit = ait+bqit 1+eit with different estimators, where rit
is fund gross alpha and qit 1 is lagged fund size. RD1 the recursive-demeaning estimator
developed by (Pástor et al., 2015), RD2 is the recursive-demeaning estimator developed
by (Zhu, 2018), Series represents the estimator developed in this paper. Slope corresponds
to the estimate of b. Slope coefficient is timed with 106 to reflect the impact of $100
million on fund performance in unit of basis point. The numbers in the parentheses are
heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics clustered by fund times month for OLS and clustered
by fund for FE and RD specifications. Moreover, the t-statistic for series estimator is cal-
culated with fund clustered-bootstrap of 1,000 replications. Panel B shows the distribution
of estimated fund skill.
Estimator
OLS FE RD1 RD2 Series
Panel A: Full Sample (January 1977 - December 2017)
FundSize (⇥106) 0.008 -0.088 -0.017 -0.676 -0.333
(0.97) (-3.85) (-0.33) (-3.09) (-5.21)
Constant 0.0006
(23.58)
Observations 563,476 563,476 554,910 559,193 535,377
Panel B: Post 91 Sample (January 1992 - December 2017)
FundSize (⇥106) 0.014 -0.070 -0.015 -0.429 -0.203
(1.73) (-3.57) (-0.24) (-1.94) (-6.37)
Constant 0.0005
(19.36)
Observations 514,779 514,779 506,859 510,548 495,539
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Table A.2
Decreasing Returns to Scale and Fund Skill in Size Quartiles with Full
Sample and Post 1991 Sample
This table shows the estimation result using the series estimator developed in this paper for
regression
rit = ait +bqit 1+ eit
,where rit is fund gross alpha and qit 1 is lagged fund size. Funds are sorted into four
quartiles according to their average fund size in the full sample. Slope corresponds to the
estimate of b. The t-statistic for series estimator is calculated with clustered-bootstrap of
200 replications. Slope coefficient is timed with 106 to reflect the impact of $100 million
on fund performance in the unit of basis point.
Size
Quartile
Avg. AUM
( $ mil)
No.
Obs
Slope: b
(⇥106) t-statistic
Monthly Skill: ait(%)
Mean S.d. 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
Panel A: Full Sample (January 1977 - December 2017)
1 37 82,931 -23.643 -5.07 0.03 0.38 -1.12 -0.14 0.06 0.23 1.02
2 131 115,410 -9.721 -2.61 0.16 0.33 -0.83 0.02 0.16 0.30 0.94
3 393 137,472 -1.662 -3.63 0.14 0.25 -0.51 0.01 0.13 0.27 0.80
4 3,093 199,496 -0.162 -6.43 0.20 0.24 -0.33 0.06 0.17 0.31 0.90
Panel B: Post 91 Sample (January 1992 - December 2017)
1 37 80,516 -23.331 -6.91 0.02 0.38 -1.12 -0.15 0.05 0.22 1.02
2 132 108,481 -8.979 -7.74 0.15 0.34 -0.85 0.00 0.15 0.30 0.94
3 405 127,802 -1.718 -9.33 0.14 0.26 -0.55 0.01 0.13 0.27 0.83
4 3,421 178,740 -0.103 -5.19 0.16 0.22 -0.39 0.03 0.15 0.29 0.75
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A.5 List of Active Sector Funds
Table A.3
List of Active Sector Funds
Ticker Sector Ticker Sector
FBIOX Biotechnology FSDPX Materials
FBMPX Multimedia FSELX Semiconductors
FBSOX IT Services FSENX Energy
FCYIX Industrials FSESX Energy Service
FDCPX Computers FSHCX Health Care Services
FDFAX Consumer Staples FSHOX Construction and Housing
FDLSX Leisure FSLBX Brokerage and Investment Management
FIDSX Financial Services FSLEX Environment and Alternative Energy
FIUIX Telecom and Utilities FSMEX Medical Equipment and Systems
FNARX Natural Resources FSNGX Natural Gas
FPHAX Pharmaceuticals FSPCX Insurance
FSAGX Gold FSPHX Health Care
FSAIX Air Transportation FSPTX Technology
FSAVX Automotive FSRBX Banking
FSCGX Industrial Equipment FSRFX Transportation
FSCHX Chemicals FSRPX Retailing
FSCPX Consumer Discretionary FSTCX Telecommunications
FSCSX Software & IT Services FSUTX Utilities
FSDAX Defense & Aerospace FSVLX Consumer Finance
FSDCX Communications Equipment FWRLX Wireless
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Table A.4
Active Return of Active Sector Funds
Benchmark is S&P 500 Index
Ticker
Benchmark-Adjusted
Return t-Statistic Ticker
Benchmark-Adjusted
Return t-Statistic
FSVLX  0.34  1.18 FSNGX 0.40 0.89
FSLEX  0.12  0.51 FCYIX 0.40 2.17**
FIDSX  0.07  0.31 FSRPX 0.44 1.96**
FSRBX  0.04  0.13 FSHOX 0.46 1.70*
FWRLX 0.02 0.06 FSENX 0.47 1.21
FIUIX 0.09 0.45 FNARX 0.47 1.24
FSTCX 0.10 0.35 FSDPX 0.48 1.75*
FSCPX 0.12 0.77 FSAIX 0.52 1.73*
FSUTX 0.12 0.51 FSHCX 0.53 1.47
FSAVX 0.24 0.63 FSDAX 0.53 2.50**
FPHAX 0.27 1.20 FSRFX 0.54 2.18**
FSPCX 0.27 1.09 FBSOX 0.54 2.87**
FDFAX 0.28 1.20 FSPTX 0.58 1.40
FSCGX 0.30 1.43 FSCHX 0.59 2.31**
FSLBX 0.30 1.19 FSESX 0.63 1.13
FSDCX 0.32 0.77 FSMEX 0.68 2.80**
FDCPX 0.35 0.90 FSELX 0.68 1.46
FDLSX 0.37 2.01** FSCSX 0.80 2.12**
FSPHX 0.37 1.56 FSAGX 0.81 1.10
FBMPX 0.39 1.95* FBIOX 0.82 1.63
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